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Traditionally youth policy has been studied from a psycho-social perspective that treats 
the concept of youth as a natural developmental stage. This dissertation adopts a political 
perspective and analyzes how political actors shape the social construction of youth. It 
documents the extent to which five sub-issues of youth policy—education, criminal justice, 
public health, social services, and workforce development—were present on the congressional 
agenda from 1973-2008. This research question is addressed through an analysis of 
congressional hearing data from a researcher-designed database of all congressional hearings 
held on youth-related issues during this 35 year-period (n = 986). This descriptive analysis 
provides a longitudinal picture of what Congress chose to consider with regard to youth issues. 
The dissertation then empirically probes possible explanations as to why the five sub-
issues of youth policy were more or less prevalent on the congressional agenda. Drawing from 
existing literature, this research posits two competing theories that may explain congressional 
attention to youth issues over time. The external events hypothesis argues that youth issues are 
present on the agenda as a result of external events catalyzing an increase in attention to youth 
issues, whereas the internal actors hypothesis asserts that internal actors such as congressional 
leaders and interest groups are responsible for promoting youth issues. These competing 
explanations are then tested with a content analysis of the hearings, supplemented with data from 
a small number of elite interviews. Results suggest that both hypotheses are partially correct, but 
that the first theory better explains the peaks in the number of hearings, signifying the role 
external conditions played in motivating Congress to hold more youth hearings. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the United States the transition from childhood to adulthood occurs legally at the age of18, 
yet in reality it is social and economic life events, such as completion of formal schooling, entry 
into the labor force, marriage and parenthood, that determine adulthood in practice (Arnett, 2004; 
Furstenberg, 2006; Hogan & Astone, 1986). Although many individuals between 16 and 24 years 
old, navigate this process relatively smoothly; for others it is an unsettling time filled with 
hardship and strife that can lead to severe consequences later in life (Institute of Medicine & 
National Research Council, 2011). These struggling young people are often described as “at-
risk,” “vulnerable,” “disconnected,” “out-of-school,” “disadvantaged,” and so forth (Fernandes, 
2007).  
There is no singular definition of this group. For instance, the 2003 White House Task Force 
for Disadvantaged Youth defined this population as “youth who, because of certain 
characteristics, circumstances, experiences or insufficiencies, encounter financial, legal, social, 
educational, emotional and/or health problems and may have significant difficulties growing into 
adults who are responsible citizens, productive workers, involved members of communities, and 
good parents” (Executive Office of the President, 2003). In other words, disadvantaged youth 
experience substantial barriers as they enter adulthood and teeter on the margins of the 
education, labor, and criminal justice spheres of society. Conversely, a 1992 Urban Institute 
Report described these young people as having “characteristics and experiences that put them at 
risk of developing problem behaviors and outcomes that have the potential to hurt their 
community, themselves or both” (Burt & Resnick, 1992, p. 13).  
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) categorizes youth policy into five issue areas: 
workforce development and job training (including community service), education, juvenile 
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justice and delinquency prevention, social services, and public health (Fernandes, 2007). This 
categorization is based on a review of federally legislated programs and policies that have been 
created to help these young people better navigate the transition to adulthood (Scott, Deschenes, 
Hopkins, Newman, & McLaughlin, 2006). Because issues affecting young people between the 
ages of 16 to 24 can be characterized as both child and adult policy issues, these five issue areas 
are the major sub-issues that constitute youth policy. The presence of youth policy on the federal 
agenda is the focus of this research. 
Traditionally youth policy has been studied from a psycho-social perspective that treats the 
concept of youth as a natural developmental stage. This dissertation, however, adopts a political 
perspective and analyzes how political actors shape the social construction of youth. Social 
construction is defined as “the underlying understanding of the social world that places meaning-
making at the center” (Schneider & Sidney, 2009). It distinguishes socially meaningful target 
populations, that is, different types of people or groups that policy is attempting to change, 
through the attribution of values, symbols, and images. Consequently, through imposed 
eligibility criteria target populations become empirically verifiable and take on group identities 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1993).  
This dissertation is also different from the majority of public policy scholarship because 
it examines agenda setting for a whole policy area that comprises many sub-issues rather than for 
a discrete issue. For instance, the majority of policy research focuses on one issue or a 
comparison among several issues, but it does not examine policy issues that have distinct sub-
issues that operate independently of the issue as a whole (e.g., Kingdon (2003) compares health 
and transportation issues). 
3 
 
In particular, this research examines the role of Congress in creating the youth policy 
agenda. Weir, Orloff, and Skocopol (1988) explain why Congress is such an important actor in 
the creation of social policy: “Within the federal government, Congress, with its strong roots in 
state and local political establishments, has remained pivotal in national domestic policy 
making—even during periods of strong executive initiative such as the New Deal and the world 
wars and the Cold War” (p. 19).  
In addition, this study examines the interest groups that testify on Capitol Hill on behalf 
of youth issues and the role they play in propagating the youth agenda in Congress. American 
government is premised on the fundamental belief that organized interests must be able to freely 
exist. While their scope and power have expanded over the generations, the purpose of interest 
groups, that is to represent their constituents before government, remains unchanged. To this 
effect, interest groups are a primary channel of access through which members voice their 
opinions to those who govern them. Organized interests struggle to frame political issues and 
engage in agenda building, thereby, making them central actors in modern American politics 
(Berry & Wilcox, 2009). Lindblom and Woodhouse (1993) explain the importance of interest 
groups this way: “Interest-group activity does not simply set segmental or particular interest 
against common interests. Instead, it helps overcome an impossible diversity and conflict of 
individual interests… [and interest groups] help greatly in structuring the conflicts” (p. 76). 
Given the broad scope of issues that comprise youth policy and the mercurial definition 
of what constitutes the youth population over the years, studying youth policy is inherently 
messy, and not surprisingly, very little research exists on the political dimensions of this topic. 
This study, therefore, represents a beginning study of federal youth policy by exploring two 





 In essence, this dissertation longitudinally examines the presence of youth policy issues 
on the congressional agenda and tests competing theories that may explain the historical patterns. 
The agenda can be defined as: “The demands that policy-makers chose to or feel compelled to 
act on, or at least, appear to be acting on, constitute the policy agenda” (Anderson, 2006, p. 87). 
Furthermore, Kingdon (2003) distinguishes between “the governmental agenda, the list of 
subjects that are getting attention, and the decision agenda, of the list of subjects within the 
governmental agenda that are up for an active decision” (p. 4). This dissertation is a study of the 
governmental agenda. The remainder of this chapter reviews the theoretical framework guiding 
the research and a detailed discussion of the research questions and hypotheses. 
1.1: Theoretical framework 
The political science literature is filled with existing research on the politics of policy 
problems and agenda setting, which is the framework from which this research is derived. This 
dissertation adds to the rich literature by examining how the complex policy problem of youth 
that comprises many sub-issues is addressed by the U.S. Congress. To that end, this research will 
provide insight into the ways changing the perception of public policy problems has contributed 
to larger structural change in American social policy 
1.1A: Policy problems 
Although the world is filled with many issues that deserve political attention, only a 
handful of issues or topics actually receive space on the governmental agenda. If all of society is 
in agreement as to how to deal with an issue then there is no need to have government spend its 
time and resources to address this issue. However, this phenomenon almost never occurs. 
Consequently, issues must be determined to be in need of government action, or in other words 
                                                     
1
 I deliberately selected this 35-year period because it is the most active period to date of domestic youth policy and 
encompasses many political and social changes in the United States. Chapter 4 provides further explanation as to the 
timeframe selection and research methodology. 
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be construed as a “policy problem.” Only once an issue is a policy problem can it be resolved by 
political actors (Anderson, 2006; Eyestone, 1978). In essence, a policy problem is the tactical 
way groups, individuals, and government agencies portray issues to promote their favored course 
of action (Stone, 2002). Stone (2002) explains:  
Problems are defined in politics and political actors make use of several different 
methods, or languages, of problem definition. Each of these languages has room for 
moral conflict and is a vehicle for expressing moral values, but there is no universal 
technical language of problem definition that yields morally correct answers (p. 134). 
She also suggests that the way problems are defined and demonstrated in politics is strategic and 
deliberate. Representations of problems, she writes, are “constructed to win the most people to 
one’s side and the most leverage over one’s opponents” (Stone, 2002, p. 133). She constructs a 
typology of ways that language is used to portray policy problems. The two most relevant 
categories in her typology to the problem definition of youth issues are symbols and numbers. 
Symbols stand for something else, yet the meaning of the symbol depends on how people 
interpret it, use it, or respond to it.  
At the core of defining policy problems is the use of language. Society exhibits strong 
political responses when issue positions are linked to cultural values through political myths and 
rituals (Cobb & Ross, 1997). In turn, it is language, symbols, and images that are used to create 
these political myths and rituals. Language plays the central role in how human beings 
understand “the issues, the leaders, the enemies, the categories, and the tests of rationality on 
which political support and opposition are based” (Edelman, 1994, p. 238). Edelman (1994) 
further explains that, “we do not experience political events or actions in any direct way, but 
always through the language used to describe them and so give them a particular meaning. 
Language, then, is political reality” (p. 238).  
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The language used to describe issues constantly evolves as issue advocates try to replace 
negative language with positive terminology. The target population that was once referred to as 
“crippled” became “handicapped,” which in turn became “disabled” (Ingram, Schneider, & 
deLeon, 2007). As the title of this study implies, the adjectives used to describe youth have 
undergone a similar evolution. Young people were often labeled as “at-risk,” a vague term that 
makes no reference to the type of hazard the person may be in jeopardy of encountering. 
Following the lead of the medical profession, the term “risk factor,” referring to the independent 
variables associated with a negative outcome entered the youth policy lexicon. Currently, 
“disconnected” is a common adjective used to describe disadvantaged young people. Those who 
use the label hope that through interventions and support, young people can become connected 
with society and its institutions, therefore subject to their positive influence.   
Similarly, cultural and symbolic factors contribute to issues of resource distribution 
through invocation of issues such as “fairness” and “group identity” (Cobb & Ross, 1997). Ross 
(1997) asserts that culture is politically relevant when it: frames the context in which politics 
occurs; links individual and collective identities; defines the boundaries between groups and 
organizes actions within and between them; provides a framework for interpreting the actions 
and motives of others; or provides resources for political organization and mobilization. Often 
cultural images are utilized to present competing perspectives on important social issues, for 
example “healthy children” versus “illegitimate teen pregnancy” in the welfare reform debate 
(Cobb & Ross, 1997). 
1.1B: Issue competition 
Just as the shaping of policy problems is a political process so too is the way in which 
issues find themselves on the agenda. Kingdon (2003) explains: “Out of the set of all conceivable 
7 
 
subjects or problems to which officials could be paying attention, they do in fact seriously attend 
to some rather than others. So the agenda-setting process narrows this set of conceivable subjects 
to the set that actually becomes the focus of attention” (p. 3). As a result of the agenda setting 
process, only a small fraction of issues within the universe of policy problems actually receive 
governmental consideration. Schattschneider summarizes the competition for policy problems as: 
“some issues being organized into politics, while others are organized out” (Schattschneider, 
1960, p. 71). He asserts that the public’s general apathy and inattention to politics allows elites to 
control government without constituency oversight. 
Downs (1972) believes that issues rise and fall in importance due to electoral 
competition. Elections create a recurring incentive for the expansion of conflict. Strategically 
minded party leaders will try to raise new issues that cross party lines or trespass on the issues of 
the other party in order to expand their electoral coalition. They often accomplish this by altering 
the problem definition of their issue. 
To explain the competition between policy issues, Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) assert that 
competition among problems arises both within each substantive area, and between areas. In 
other words, each issue area must have an internal debate to decide on which issue(s) to market 
and support in the public arena. Then all the issues chosen by the different policy arenas must 
compete with each other to reach agenda status. Problems that win this competition are then able 
to gain widespread attention and grow into “celebrities” which dominate arenas of public 
discourse. 
1.1C: Agenda denial and non-decisions 
Since issues have to win their place on the agenda, there is also the presence of agenda 
denial and non-decisions that both act to block issues from receiving governmental attention. 
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Agenda denial occurs when those who want to maintain the current state and oppose 
governmental action use their political resources to block issues from reaching the agenda. They 
do this by often denying that a problem exists (e.g., second-hand smoke from tobacco) or 
suggesting that it is private matter that is not appropriately handled by government (e.g. teaching 
evolution in school). 
Similarly, nondecision-making is another use of power to prevent issues from reaching 
the formal agenda. Issues that do not reach the agenda as a result of this type of power are 
referred to as “non-issues.” Similarly, “non-decision making” is defined as the:   
Means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges 
in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed 
before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or failing all these things, 
maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage of the policy process. (Bachrach 
& Baratz, 1970, p. 44) 
 
As such, inaction by those less powerful should not be seen as their choice or attributed to apathy 
or ignorance; rather it should be viewed as the product of their purposeful exclusion through an 
exploitation of their feelings of fear, vulnerability, or induced hopelessness (Gaventa, 1980). 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) assert that research on the policy making process must 
include the acts of “non-decision makers” or people whose political power prevents certain 
issues from reaching the public arena. They argue that what does not get voiced and discussed in 
political discourse is more important that what does get discussed. The real exhibit of political 
power which they refer to as the “second face of power,” therefore, is the ability to keep issues 
off the agenda. Instead of just looking at the big decisions, they argue that it is more important to 
know who controls the routine political decisions. 
Moreover, in studying the lack of political attention to air pollution, Crenson (1971) 
tackles the empirical problem of studying “non-issues” by analyzing the political explanations 
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for ignoring this significant phenomenon. He uses a two-dimensional view of power, similar to 
Bachrach and Baratz, to explain why Gary and East Chicago, Indiana, two neighboring cities 
with similar populations and equal levels of pollution, took very different paths in terms of 
combating air pollution. While East Chicago began to clean its air in 1949, it was not until 1962 
that Gary followed suit. According to Crenson, U.S. Steel, which built Gary, not only prevented 
the issue from being raised, but when an anti-pollution ordinance was finally enacted, U.S. Steel 
influenced the content, albeit without actually entering the political arena. The remaining 
theories of the agenda setting process are discussed in the next section. 
1.2: Research questions & hypotheses 
This study empirically documents the extent to which youth policy, comprised of five 
main sub-issues, was present on the congressional agenda from 1973 to 2008. This research 
question is addressed through an analysis of congressional hearing data from a researcher-
designed database of all congressional hearings held on youth-related issues during this period. 
Data from this database includes all laws, hearings, testimonies, and witnesses involved in youth 
policy on Capitol Hill. As a result, this descriptive analysis provides a longitudinal picture of 
what Congress chose to consider with regard to youth issues. The findings from this research 
question are then used to inform the remainder of the study which empirically probes possible 
explanations as to why the sub-issues that comprise youth policy were more or less prevalent on 
the congressional agenda over these 35 years. Drawing from existing literature, this dissertation 
posits two competing theories that may explain the change in attention Congress gave youth 
issues. The external events hypothesis argues that youth issues are present on the agenda as a 
result of external events catalyzing an increase in attention to youth issues, whereas the internal 
actors hypothesis asserts that political actors, such as congressional leaders and interest groups, 
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are responsible for promoting youth issues. These competing explanations are then empirically 
tested with a content analysis of the youth related hearings and supplemented with data from a 
small number of interviews with experts in federal youth policy. The two competing theories are 
presented below.  
1.2A: Hypothesis I: External events 
The first explanation argues that youth issues were present on the congressional agenda 
as a result larger institutional and environmental factors enabling the promotion of youth issues 
on the national agenda. During this era in United States history, the country experienced external 
environmental shocks, such as inner city riots, the explosion of the crack-cocaine epidemic, and 
the release of major reports such as A Nation at Risk to name a few, that provided policy 
entrepreneurs with the opening to seek governmental change towards young people. Similarly, 
public education became an area of great concern as the Cold War and the 1957 launch of 
Sputnik fueled the race to have America produce a more educated workforce to compete with the 
Soviet Union (Kaestle & Lodewick, 2007). This hypothesis suggests that policy entrepreneurs 
responded to these external events and as a result Congress held hearings on youth issues in 
reaction to these changing environmental conditions. 
There are many theories of the policy making process that highlight the role of policy 
entrepreneurs in the agenda setting process. Mintrom and Vergari (1996) define these actors as 
follows: 
Policy entrepreneurs can be thought of as doing for the policymaking process what 
business entrepreneurs do for the marketplace. That is to say, policy entrepreneurs serve 
to bring new policy ideas into good currency. Like their business counterparts, they are 




Although many of the theories of policymaking acknowledge that policy entrepreneurs often 
capitalize on external events to advance their agenda, the theories differ in the degree to which 
policy entrepreneurs actively manipulate external events for their own advantage.  
According to Kingdon (2003)
2
, policy entrepreneurs are ready and waiting to seize their 
“policy window,” or the intersection of an advantageous political climate, a politically palatable 
problem and solution, and a lack of political opposition (often discusses as three separate 
streams). Each of these streams has structural elements that must all coincide and be exploited by 
a policy entrepreneur according to this policy formation framework. The problem stream 
includes the issues that require political attention, the policy stream is a conglomeration of ideas 
that compete to win prominence amongst policymakers, and the political stream includes the 
environmental situation, such as legislative turnover and national mood (Zahariadis, 2007). Only 
when these three streams come together to create a policy window are policy entrepreneurs able 
to capitalize on the moment to advance their policy agenda.  
Moreover, Kingdon (2003) notes that social problems do not reach the agenda simply 
because they are important, and certain solutions are not preferred merely because they are 
germane. Rather, social problems are more likely to be included on the government’s decision 
agenda if they have certain features – such as dramatic symbolism or resonance with dominant 
social values. The solutions to those socially recognized problems often do not arise through 
careful review of alternative possibilities, but are often arrived at in idiosyncratic ways. Solutions 
may often exist prior to the problems they supposedly solve and are regularly coupled with 
barely relevant problems by entrepreneurs seeking opportunities to push pet solutions. As a 
                                                     
2
 This theory originally described by Kingdon (2003), is often referred to as the multiple streams or policy streams 
theory by Sabatier and other scholars (Sabatier, 1991; Zahariadis, 2007). 
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result, “Kingdon’s theory appears to make agenda setting a rather random or chancy process; 
much depends upon timing and luck” (Anderson, 2006, p. 90). 
Furthermore, Kingdon’s theory gives equal weight to the three streams and does not give 
causal priority to any one of them. As a result the theory assumes that all three of the streams are 
necessary, but that independently each stream is not enough, thereby, making it easy to explain 
away examples that do not fit the theory. For instance, if an issue fails to reach the agenda 
despite the presence of a policy window, Kingdon would argue that entrepreneurs were missing 
or lacked the savvy to exploit the window of opportunity. Although Kingdon may be correct in 
his assessment of the policy process, there is also analytical value in more sharply distinguishing 
the two kinds of theoretical explanations. In essence, the external events hypothesis in this study 
poses changing environmental conditions as the catalytic element enabling more youth issues to 
receive congressional attention, with policy entrepreneurs seen as reactive. 
1.2B: Hypothesis II: Internal actors 
The second theory asserts that internal political actors, such as congressional leaders and 
interest groups were the primary actors responsible for facilitating the presence of youth issues 
on the congressional agenda. According to this perspective, congressional leaders, through 
strategically calling hearings and inviting witnesses, and youth interest groups, through 
strategically testifying at the same hearings publicized the importance of youth issues. In 
essence, congressional leaders and youth interest groups acted as policy entrepreneurs and 
redefined the social construction of youth and shopped around to find the most advantageous 
venue to advance their issue. This hypothesis places less emphasis on the changing 
environmental conditions; rather, it asserts that it was the internal actors themselves that 
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strategically pushed for more attention to youth issues. This hypothesis is based on the 
punctuated equilibrium theory and the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). 
Punctuated equilibrium theory highlights the active role policy agents play in redefining 
policy issues and the institutional venues in which they are considered (True, Jones, & 
Baumgartner, 2007). The theory describes the policymaking process as the work of policy 
monopolies, which are in the business of developing and marketing how and what the public 
thinks of their issues (policy images). Policy monopolies lead to long periods of political stasis as 
the myriad of political issues facing society are handled by many different policy subsystems. 
These subsystems tend to be characterized by policy monopolies dominated by a core policy 
image connected to fundamental political values. In order to maintain their position of power, 
policy monopolies resist change (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Meijerink, 2005; True, et al., 
2007). 
This stability is punctuated, however, when actors, often led by policy entrepreneurs, are 
successful in altering the image of their problem and the venue responsible for implementing 
solutions. The theory suggests that movement into a new policy venue attracts new supporters 
and that the rise of a new policy image, which is “shopped” in new venues, enables new actors to 
become involved. Once new participants become involved and feel they now have right to say 
something on the issue, a sharp change in policy direction can occur (Meijerink, 2005; True, et 
al., 2007). While in Hypothesis I policy entrepreneurs wait for their policy window to open as a 
result of external streams coming together (Kingdon, 2003), in Hypothesis II political actors, 
such as congressional leaders and interest groups, actively participate in the agenda-setting 
process and do not wait for the perfect storm of environmental conditions to come together 
giving them a political window (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).  
14 
 
The advocacy coalition framework (ACF)
3
, which emphasizes the role of semi-
autonomous policy communities or “policy subsystems” in the policymaking process, also 
guides Hypothesis II (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). These 
policy subsystems are comprised of various advocacy coalitions that are promoting different 
policy issues and proposals. Each advocacy coalition includes “actors from various public and 
private organizations who share a set of beliefs and who seek to realize their common goals over 
time” (Sabatier, 1986, p. 39). What distinguish the various advocacy coalitions within a policy 
subsystem are the different belief systems about the nature of society, public problems, and the 
types of policy solutions that should be advanced to solve them. These beliefs can be either 
“deep core” referring to basic norms and shared values or “policy core” understandings that 
affect a particular policy subsystem, including “strategies for realizing core values within the 
subsystem” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007).  
The advocacy coalition framework suggests that groups choose their allies based on 
perceived trustworthiness and core belief compatibility guided by bounded rationality (Jones, 
2003; Leach & Sabatier, 2005; Simon, 1985). In response to the rational choice movement, 
which argues that individuals make decisions based on rational cost-benefit analyses, bounded 
rationality asserts that human rationality is limited (Jones, 2003; March & Olsen, 1989; Simon, 
1983). Due to individuals’ imperfect ability to process and analyze information, human decisions 
are not made through modeling their utility; rather “[individuals] decide what their main 
priorities are (that may not be rational) and then attempt to fit their needs as well as they can” 
(Koelble, 1995, pp. 233-234). The assumptions of bounded rationality, therefore, guide the 
choices organizations make in terms of relationships with other groups.  
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 While ACF provides an actor-centered perspective, in practice its proponents, often blur the distinction between 
actors and events by also discussing how external factors may play a critical role in the policy process. This is 




The first explanation asserts that the presence of youth policy on the congressional 
agenda emerged in response to policy entrepreneurs capitalizing on larger environmental issues, 
whereas the second theory places the onus on the political actors as the drivers of the youth 
policy agenda. In sum, the first explanation asserts that the policy problem formed in reaction to 
policy entrepreneurs capitalizing on broader external shocks that open policy windows, while the 
second explanation presents the issue formation as a strategic attempt by congressional leaders 
and interest groups to publicize the importance of youth policy.  
This dissertation includes several theories of the policy process and attempts to separate 
these theories into two opposing perspectives. In reality, however, these theories all borrow from 
each other and include similar elements such as policy windows, external shocks, and policy 
entrepreneurs. As a result, this study capitalizes on key elements of each theory in order to 
identify important distinctions in the policymaking process.  
1.3: Limitations of study 
The policy process can be conceptualized as a five stage model: problem identification 
and agenda setting, formulation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation (Anderson, 2006). 
This dissertation examines the first stage of the policy process model—problem definition and 
agenda setting. It does not examine what aspects of the youth policy agenda are adopted into 
legislation and implemented. Nor does it examine the change in appropriations for federally-
funded youth programs. Future research would be needed to address these issues and are outside 
the scope of this research. Additional limitations of this study will be discussed in the data and 
methods chapter as well as in the final chapter. 
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1.4: The plan of the dissertation 
The chapters that follow demonstrate the presence of youth policy issues on the 
congressional agenda and the reasons that account for the historical trends. Chapter 2 provides a 
more in-depth discussion of youth and the issues affecting young adults. In order to contextualize 
the period under examination in this research it also reviews federal policy towards young people 
prior to 1973, with an emphasis on how various levels of government have contended with youth 
issues. Examining congressional attention to youth policy from 1973 to 2008, Chapter 3 explains 
the data collection strategy and methodology for the study. Chapter 4 presents the main findings 
of the study and uses empirical evidence to test the hypotheses laid out in this chapter. Finally, 
Chapter 5 discusses the implications of this research for American social policy and suggests 
how future research can further contribute to the larger subject of youth policy. 
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Chapter 2: Context 
This chapter provides the context necessary to analyze of congressional attention to youth 
issues from 1973 to 2008. It begins by expanding the discussion of youth and the issues affecting 
young adults that were included in Chapter 1. It then reviews federal policy towards young 
people before 1973, with an emphasis on how prior to the 1970s youth policy was fragmented by 
issue (e.g., workforce development, education etc.) and by the age of the youth population. As 
this chapter will show, the United States of America has never had an overarching policy 
targeted towards young people. Instead, modern federal youth policy emerged in response to 
perceived deficiencies plaguing young adults, thereby leading to a national history of scattered 
social policy towards children and youth (Scott, et al., 2006). In particular, the history of federal 
youth policy shows how it was crafted in response to societal changes, such as increasing inner-
city poverty and unemployment, as well as in reaction to poor educational outcomes that started 
to became apparent in the 1960s and 70s. Finally, this chapter argues that these same societal 
changes contributed to the rationale used by youth policy groups to work together. Whereas 
previously interest groups had predominantly worked independently, it was during this same 
period that they began strategically to form coalitions. 
2.1: Definition of youth  
“Youth is an elastic category: where it begins and ends is subject to interpretation and is 
sensitive to social and historical context” (Flanagan & Syvertsen, 2005, p. 11). Psychologists 
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consider it to be a period when individuals explore and consolidate their identity (Erikson, 1968). 
As youth work to make sense of who they are as individuals and the society around them, they 
begin to develop their own ideology and viewpoint distinct from the choices their parents may 
have made. Steinberg and Lerner (2004) describe young people as the “generational cohort that 
must next be prepared to assume the quality of leadership of self, family, community, and society 
that will maintain and improve human life” (p. 52). Due to the general vagueness in definitions 
for this segment of the population, it is difficult to determine when individuals reach this middle 
stage and cease being children. Flanagan and Syversten (2005) explain: “In summary, youth is a 
social construction: its meaning varies according to the particular contexts in which people are 
making transitions from the dependencies of childhood to assume the responsibilities of 
adulthood” (p. 13).  
The terms youth and adolescence are often used interchangeably. In 1904 psychologist G. 
Stanley Hall established the idea of adolescence, which he defined as the period of “storm and 
stress” between childhood and adulthood where youth are vulnerable to risky behavior, conflict 
with parents, and perversion (Hall, 1904). Over the years, theorists such as Piaget, Erikson and 
others, have built upon the work of Hall to further the conceptualization of the stages of 
adolescence. Table 2.1 presents an approximate chronology of the theories of adolescence 
developed since the early 20
th
 century. These theories focus on many different aspects of 
adolescent development and attempt to explain why adolescent behavior is different from both 
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child and adult behavior. Today, adolescence is generally depicted as covering three stages of 
development: early adolescence (ages 10-14), middle adolescence (ages 15-19), and late 
adolescence (ages 20-24) (Spano, 2004). Each stage of adolescence is marked by specific 
characteristics of behavior both physically and cognitively (Spano, 2004). This study uses the 
term youth to refer to middle and late adolescence (ages 16 to 24). The last stage is also 
sometimes referred to as young adulthood. 
Table 2.1: Theories of adolescence, presented in approximate chronological order 
Developmental Area Theorist Focus 
Biological G. Stanley Hall Biology determines the period of physical 
and social development. 
Psychological Sigmund Freud Anxiety and sexual excitement characterize 
adolescence. 
Psychosocial Erik Erikson Identity development characterizes 
adolescence. 
Cognitive Jean Piaget Development of abstract thought, rather 
than concrete thought, characterizes period. 
Ecological (interaction between 
individual and environment) 
Urie Bronfenbrenner Development determined by context (e.g., 
family, peers, schools etc.). 
Social Cognitive Learning Albert Bandura Adolescent development occurs through 
emulating adult behavior, and the 
relationship between social and 
environmental factors. 
Cultural Margaret Mead Development determined by culture. 
Source: Spano, S. (2004). Stages of adolescent development. ACT for Youth Upstate Center of Excellence 
Research Facts and Findings.  
 
These changing conceptions of adolescence are associated with changes in scientific 
research, but also with sociological developments that have fundamentally altered the nature of 
youth and adolescence. In the past, most of the major life events that had traditionally been 
considered the identifying markers of adulthood were attained by individuals in their late teens or 
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early 20s. This timeframe, however, is no longer the norm. Today’s youth are devoting more 
time to higher education, delaying entry into the labor force, and marrying and having children 
later in life (Arnett, 1998, 2000). Consequently, “entry into adulthood has become more 
ambiguous and generally occurs in a gradual, complex, and less uniform fashion [than in the 
past]” (Settersten Jr., Furstenberg Jr., & Rumbaut, 2005, p. 5). Furstenberg explains: “No longer 
does the end of adolescence signal the beginning of adulthood. Today, the twenties have become 
what the late teens were a half century ago—a time of transition” (Furstenberg, 2006, p. 303). In 
sum, young adulthood in 2012 is a much longer period compared to young adulthood in 1970. 
Although considerable research has been done in the field of human development to 
reframe how adults think of adolescence, many still consider it to be a particularly difficult stage 
of life—one that individuals must endure to reach adulthood. Gary Walker, former President of 
Public/Private Ventures, explains it this way:  
Adults see adolescence as a confusing and trying time, full of new thinking, 
experimentation and hormonal change, ups and downs in mood—hard to characterize 
easily, hard to predict, hard to explain in terms of cause and effect…In the end, to them, 
adolescence is something to “get through”—so internally driven as to be impervious to 
outside influence. (Walker, 2000, p. 71) 
 
Scholars and advocates of youth, however, disagree with the negative undertones that are 
associated with the word “adolescence.” Instead of thinking of adolescence as a period of “storm 
and stress,” youth activists perceive this developmental phase as a process by which caring 
adults can help facilitate the process of discovery and development which young people need to 
reach adulthood. In turn, supporters have argued for the use of the term youth development (often 
with the term positive preceding it) to describe the process of transition from childhood to 
adulthood. Karen Pittman, a champion of youth development, and her colleagues explain youth 
development as:  
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...the ongoing growth process in which all youth are engaged in attempting to (1) meet 
their basic personal and social needs to be safe, feel cared for, be valued, be useful, and 
be spiritually grounded, and (2) to build skills and competencies that allow them to 
function and contribute in their daily lives. (Pittman, O'Brien, & Kimball, 1993, p. 8) 
 
Newman, Smith, and Murphy elaborate: “Youth development then is a combination of all of the 
people, places, supports, opportunities and services that most of us inherently understand that 
young people need to be happy, healthy, and successful” (Newman, Smith, & Murphy, 2000, p. 
85). Or in the words of Hugh Price, former president of the National Urban League, youth 
development is "what parents do for their children...on a good day" (Center for Youth 
Development and Policy Research, n.d.). 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the transition to adulthood for many individuals occurs 
without too much hardship. Policymakers, practitioners, and researchers, however, often 
subdivide those who struggle during this period based on their risk factors and life experience. 
For example, these groups include, but are by no means limited to (Osgood, Foster, Flanagan, & 
Ruth, 2007; Wald & Martinez, 2003): 
 Youth emancipating from foster care 
 Runaway and homeless youth 
 Youth involved in the juvenile justice system 
 High school dropouts 
 Young unmarried mothers 
 Youth who are neither working nor in school 
It is also important to note that these groups are not mutually exclusive; rather many young 
people fall into more than one of these categories. For example, many youth transitioning out of 
foster care at the age of 18 are more likely to become homeless since they are less economically 
secure than the general youth population and do not often have family support or resources at 
their disposal (Osgood, Foster, & Courtney, 2010). 
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The difficulties in operationalizing the term youth have led to significant variation in how 
programs and policies define youth for the purposes of service delivery and research (United 
States Government Accountability Office, February 2008; Wald & Martinez, 2003). As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, this study uses 16-24 to define youth because it contains young people 
who are legally considered both adults and children.
4
 This age range also captures young people 
who could be enrolled in either secondary or postsecondary education. It also includes public 
services that are dedicated to working with children (e.g. juvenile justice, foster care) and adults 
(e.g. community college, criminal court, workforce development programs). This definition, 
while not perfect, clearly delineates the youth population. 
2.2: History of federal youth policy 
It was not until the 1960s that policies explicitly targeted to youth reached the political 
agenda (Scott, et al., 2006). Previously the federal government had created policies and programs 
to meet the needs of women and children, but youth policy as we currently know it is an 
extension of policies created only in the last 50-60 years. The following sections briefly describe 
federal social policy with youth components leading up to the 1960s and the major initiatives 
targeted to youth that were created during the 1960s and 1970s. 
2.2A: Early youth policy 
Scholars have suggested that although the United States has not developed a modern 
welfare state along the lines of those created in Western Europe, the country first developed an 
approximation of federal social policy following the Civil War when the country provided 
benefits to veterans and their dependents (Skocpol, 1992). Although the federal government 
                                                     
4
 Although scholars of youth and youth policy may contest this definition, it is an attempt to meet Gerring’s (2001) 
seven criteria of conceptual adequacy: coherence, operationalization, validity, field utility, resonance, parsimony, 
and analytic utility. 
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created some social policies during the 19
th
 century, it was not until the early 20
th
 century that the 
federal government made a larger push into this policy area. For instance, in 1912 the Children’s 
Bureau in the U.S. Department of Labor was established to address the central child welfare 
issues of the time (i.e.: child labor and juvenile delinquency) and the Congress passed the 
Sheppard-Towner Act in 1921, the first social welfare legislation for children and mothers 
(Skocpol, 1996). This Act, however, was repealed after a few years. 
The Children’s Bureau’s most important contribution to youth policy was through its 
implementation of the child health and welfare programs established by the Social Security Act 
(P.L. 74-231) of 1935. This included federal funding for states to create and enlarge public child 
welfare services in special needs areas of the country. In addition, the Aid to Dependent Children 
Program, now called the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant, was established 
to provide financial resources to impoverished children. 
In the early 20
th
 century, juvenile justice courts were also established in almost all of the 
states. The foundation for the juvenile justice system rested in the doctrine of “parens patriae” 
which translates into “the state as parent.” “Parens patriae” was first established in the 15th 
century in reference to orphans, but beginning in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries it was 
applied to poor children whose parents were still living (Schwartz, 2000). In essence it allowed 
the state to intervene and protect young people whose parents were deemed to not be providing 
adequate supervision or care (Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, n.d.). Although, the focus 
on the juvenile court during this period was on rehabilitating the offender, rather than 
punishment based on offense, the majority of youth who entered the juvenile justice system were 
“poor, ghetto-dwelling children of recent immigrants” (Schlossman & Wallach, 1978, p. 71). In 
reviewing court documents from select cities in the early 20
th
 century, researchers found that:  
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In Milwaukee, for example, more than 90 percent of the children brought into the court 
were the offspring of European immigrants. Of these, three out of four were either 
German or Polish. In Chicago, San Francisco, and New Haven the ethnic background of 
delinquents was similar, although southeastern European countries were more frequently 
represented, reflecting the different patterns of immigrant settlement in these cities. 
(Schlossman & Wallach, 1978, p. 71) 
 
In sum, early juvenile justice policy towards young people was based on the assumption that the 
state could meet the needs of young people from poor immigrant backgrounds better than their 
families. 
Several years later, the federal government also addressed youth issues in response to the 
massive unemployment and social upheaval caused by the Great Depression through the 1935 
creation of the National Youth Administration (NYA) as a youth counterpart to the Works 
Progress Administration
5
 (WPA). The NYA included three components to assist young people 
between the ages of 16 and 25. The first component provided funds for part-time employment of 
needy high school, college, and graduate students to help them complete school. This was 
referred to as the student aid program and later renamed the school work program. The second 
component, called the work projects program, allocated funds for part-time employment on work 
projects for unemployed out-of-school youth. Finally, the third component, the guidance and 
placement program, was offered to young people in both the student aid and work projects 
programs (Praeger, 1977).  
By the 1940s, however, many of the institutions and programs created in the early 20
th
 
century were abolished. Since the NYA was created by Executive Order it had no legislative 
recognition and was terminated in July 1943 (Praeger, 1977). Similarly, in 1949 the Children’s 
Bureau was moved from the U.S. Department of Labor to the Federal Security Agency and then 
in 1953 to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and child health policy issues were 
                                                     
5
 The Works Progress Administration was one of the major initiatives of the New Deal designed to employ millions 
of unskilled workers in public works projects, such as construction of public roads and buildings. 
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transferred to the Public Health Service. This reorganization of the Children’s Bureau was due to 
the federal government’s widespread reorganization that prioritized agency function over the 
constituency served by the agency (Fernandes, 2007). 
Furthermore, the federal programs of this era were primarily devoted to job creation and 
federal relief to alleviate the widespread poverty caused by the Great Depression. The 
educational initiatives that were included in federal policy during this era came principally from 
the need to tide people over and put them back to work; thus “when the need for work relief 
declined as the economy recovered with the onset of World War II, the rationale for these 
programs evaporated, and they were abolished by Congress” (Kantor & Lowe, 1995, p. 5). As a 
result, the federal government did not initiate any additional substantial youth policy until the 
Great Society programs of the 1960s.  
2.2B: Youth policy of the 1960s and 1970s 
Although the federal government previously established policies to assist children and 
youth in the early 20
th
 century, there was not an expansion of policy towards this section of the 
population until the 1960s and 1970s. During this rapid expansion of social policy, the federal 
government targeted children, adults, and the elderly. This marked the beginning of widespread 
federal involvement in youth issues, as well as many other social issues that were once 
considered to be outside their jurisdiction (Cross, 2003; Kaestle & Lodewick, 2007). Peterson 
(1995) explains: “Only gradually did it become clear that state and local governments for all 
their ability to work with business leaders to enhance community prosperity, had difficulty 
meeting the needs of the poor and the needy” (p. 10).  
The poverty referenced by Peterson became increasingly apparent during this period 
when the plight of the American city, (home of many struggling young adults) entered the public 
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consciousness. Researchers who study this period in American history have sought to explain the 
demographic and economic shifts of this period. They suggest that as white-flight from urban to 
suburban areas intensified, rust-belt cities became more demographically and economically 
homogenous—predominantly home to disadvantaged people of color, or what many call the 
“underclass” (Massey & Denton, 1993; Wilson, 1990). The loss of the urban tax base from white 
flight was compounded by the widespread loss of low-skilled jobs as companies fled to the south 
and finally overseas; as well as by massive private sector disinvestment in urban areas. There 
were even reports of property owners burning their property to receive insurance money, as that 
yielded more money than selling or renting urban property during the 1970s (Time, 1977). As a 
result, many cities in the Midwest and Northeast became areas of concentrated poverty. 
Furthermore, during this period structural economic factors including technological 
advances, foreign trade, and immigration, started to influence employers’ demands for a more 
educated labor force (Katz & Autor, 1999). The decline of blue-collar jobs, especially in 
industrial sectors such as manufacturing that pay relatively high wages, and the increase of 
service-sector employment that requires more advanced skills, contributed to the decline in 
economic opportunities for low-income individuals, especially those without a high school 
diploma. In fact, research suggests that the earning power of dropouts has been in almost 
continuous decline over the past three decades. In 1971, male dropouts earned $35,087 (in 2002 
dollars). In 2002 male dropout earnings fell 35 percent to $23,903 (Barton, 2005). 
The federal government capitalized on the public momentum and the Democratic Party 
argued that the nation needed a comprehensive strategy to address social and urban problems. 
For instance, the National Commission on Urban Problems (1958), the National Commission on 
Civil Disorders (1967), the President’s Task Force on Suburban Problems (1967), and President 
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Nixon’s Commission on Population Growth and the American Future (1972) were all influential 
federal reports that examined the problems of racial segregation and discrimination, poverty, and 
inner-city decline (Judd & Swanstrom, 2008). In addition, in 1962 the Ford Foundation in 
conjunction with other funders launched Mobilization for Youth (MFY)—the first large-scale 
program created to control and ameliorate juvenile crime in cities. According to Passow (1977), 
“in this pre-war-on-poverty era, it was juvenile delinquency which provided access to program 
funding. MYF’s approach was a comprehensive one involving projects in the so-called worlds of 
legal services, neighborhood and community services, work, mental health, and education” (pp. 
5-6). 
Youth policy of the 1960s, however, really began with the assassination of President 
Kennedy in 1963, which allowed newly-sworn in President Johnson to capitalize on the civil 
rights legislation Kennedy had introduced to Congress a few months prior (now known as the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964) and create further legislation to address economic inequalities. In 
President Johnson’s first State of the Union address on January 10, 1964 he said: “This 
Administration here and now declares unconditional war on poverty in America, and I urge this 
Congress and all Americans to join me in that effort” (Judd & Swanstrom, 2008, pp. 160-161). 
The social policy programs of the Great Society, however, stand in sharp contrast to the 
earlier New Deal federal programs. Kantor and Lowe (1995) explain that, “although the CCC 
[Civilian Conservation Corps], NYA [National Youth Administration], and WPA [Works 
Progress Administration] provided a variety of educational services to those most in need, 
concern about poverty, race, and the role of education in expanding economic opportunity for 
minorities and the poor did not dominate discussions about social policy in the New Deal, as it 
did in the Great Society and the War on Poverty that was part of it” (p. 5). Moreover, President 
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Johnson’s War on Poverty initiatives and subsequent social legislation established many 
programs targeted to the socio-economically disadvantaged, minority communities in response to 
the changing societal conditions previously discussed. 
In terms of youth policy, this period established many programs in the areas of workforce 
development, education, juvenile justice, social services, and public health, which were often 
created independently of each other (Fernandes, 2007). Consequently, youth policy emerged as 
an uncoordinated effort designed more to solve specific problems rather than to meet the needs 
of young people holistically. The major legislation during this period, in chronological order, 
included: 
 The Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964 (P.L. 88-452), was the linchpin of the War 
on Poverty and created the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), which administered 
programs to encourage the well-being of youth and individuals with low socio-economic 
status. Programs included: Job Corps (to promote vocational and educational 
opportunities for older low-income youth), the Neighborhood Youth Corps (to provide 
work, training and education for economically disadvantaged youth aged 16 to 24), 
Upward Bound (to assist disadvantaged high school students attend college), Volunteers 
in Service to America (VISTA) (the domestic counterpart to the Peace Corps) which sent 
volunteers into economically depressed American communities, and Head Start (a child 
development program for low-income children ages 3-5).  
 Higher Education Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-329), increased federal funding to postsecondary 
institutions and established financial aid in the form of scholarships and low-interest 
loans for students. It also created the Talent Search program to identify older, low-
income youth with potential for postsecondary education. The Higher Education Act 
(HEA) was amended in 1968 (P.L. 90-575) to include two programs: Student Support 
Services to improve disadvantaged college students’ retention and graduation rates, and 
Upward Bound (transferred from the OEO to the Office of Education and later to the U.S. 
Department of Education). 
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 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 (P.L. 89-10), the first major 
piece of federal education policy provided federal funding to low-income schools. The 
core idea of the ESEA was that most public schools were adequately educating American 
children, and the schools with poor outcomes were geographically concentrated in low-
income neighborhood. The legislation did not interfere with local and state responsibility 
of school governance; rather it provided additional funds to low-income schools 
(McGuinn, 2006). 
 Youth Conservation Corps Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-378), permanently established the Youth 
Conservation Pilot Program to employ youth between the ages of 15 and 19 of all 
backgrounds to perform work on federal lands, such as the National Wildlife Refuges, 
National Fish Hatcheries, research stations, and other facilities. 
 Comprehensive Employment and Training Activities Act (CETA) of 1973 (P.L. 93-203), 
established federal funding for the Youth Employment and Training Program and the 
Summer Youth Employment Program, both of which financed employment training 
activities and on-the-job training for young people, including out-of-school youth. 
 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) of 1974 (P.L. 93-415), 
extended federal support to states and local governments for rehabilitative and 
preventative juvenile justice delinquency projects, as established under the Juvenile 
Delinquency Prevention and Control Act (P.L. 90-445). Title III established the Runaway 
Youth Program to provide temporary shelter, counseling, and after-care services to 
runaway youth. Congress later amended (P.L. 95-115) Title III to also include homeless 
youth. 
 Education for All Handicapped Children (now known as the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act or IDEA) of 1975 (P.L. 94-142), required all public schools accepting 
federal funds to provide equal access to education for children with all physical and 
mental disabilities, no matter how severe. Public schools were required to create an 
individual education plan (IEP) in the least restrictive environment for these students to 
ensure they received a fair public education. 
 
As will be described in Chapter 4, these laws and associated programs continue to influence 
congressional youth policy since they have all been reauthorized several times since their 
30 
 
creation, thereby requiring Congress to devote its attention to the issues these laws attempt to 
address. In sum, modern youth policy is very much an artifact of laws and policy created during 
the Great Society and the subsequent domestic policy framework implemented in the 1960s and 
1970s.  
Besides legislative changes affecting youth policy in the 1960s and 1970s there was also 
important work done by the judicial branch of government which impacted youth. In the 1960s 
there was a pervasive view among youth stakeholders that young people transgressing the law 
were being inappropriately placed in the juvenile justice system instead of receiving the 
appropriate social services. It was also argued that young people in the juvenile system were not 
being treated fairly according to the law. As a result, the Supreme Court became involved in 
youth policy in its 1967 ruling In re Gault, which mandated that due process, under the 14
th
 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, be applied to the juvenile court system (Dorsen & 
Rezneck, 1967). The ruling stated: “Under our constitution, the condition of being a boy does not 
justify a kangaroo court” ("In re Gault," 1967). 
As such, the ruling entitled juveniles to constitutional procedural protections similar to those 
of adults, such as adequate and timely notice of charges and hearings, the right to counsel at 
adjudication, the right to confront and cross‐ examine witnesses, and the protection against 
self‐ incrimination (Schwartz, 2000, p. 242). In re Gault laid the foundation for 1974’s Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, which emphasized that youth committing status 
offenses (behaviors considered offenses only if carried out by a juvenile, such as truancy and 
running away) were more in need of care and guidance than they were of punishment. 
Furthermore, the executive branch became involved in youth policy in both 1960 and 1971 
when the White House devoted its annual Conference on Children and Youth to efforts to 
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promote opportunities for youth. The 1960 conference focused on the role that community 
agencies can play to help parents address the concerns of youth, as well as how to improve social 
services to young adults. “The recommendations called for the federal government to establish a 
unit devoted to youth and to support public and private research regarding the issues facing this 
population, including their employment, education, military service, marriage, mobility, and 
community involvement” (Fernandes, 2007). This call for action has been repeated in various 
forms and continues today.  
In addition, the 1971 conference recommended a suspension of the draft, less punitive 
measures for drug possession, and income guarantees for poor families—issues all relevant to 
that era in American history. Finally, in 1970 the Family and Youth Services Bureau (FYSB) in 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services was created “to provide youth at risk of 
becoming involved in risky behavior with positive alternatives, ensuring their safety, and 
maximizing their potential to take advantage of available opportunities” (American Youth Policy 
Forum, 1999). These changes in federal policy set the backdrop for the modern youth policy 
agenda, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
2.3: Interest group research 
The final important contextual consideration is the role of interest groups in American 
politics. Since the second hypothesis explaining congressional attention to youth asserts that 
interest groups working in coalitions facilitated the presence of youth issues on the congressional 
agenda, it is necessary to review the prior research on this topic. Just as youth policy was 
initiated on a large scale in the 1960s and 70s in response to societal changes, interest groups 
also began to emerge in larger numbers during this period and started to form coalitions.  
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2.3A: Types of interest groups 
Interest groups have always played an important role in American politics (e.g. see 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America), but in the 1960s and 1970s the nation 
experienced an explosion of organized groups forming and locating or relocating to Washington 
D.C. in order to lobby and attempt to influence the federal government. Berry and Wilcox (2009) 
present data showing a huge increase in the number of interest groups that established 
Washington, D.C. offices or moved their headquarters to become more involved in federal 
politics. “Before 1920, only one corporation had a permanent Washington office. In 1978, there 
were 175 corporations with D.C. offices; by 2004, the number had grown to more than 600” (p. 
17). Other scholars suggest that the increase in the number of interest groups located in 
Washington D.C. during this period was closely related to the rise in the number of issues on the 
federal agenda, creating a unique political culture:  
With more public policies, more groups are being mobilized and there are more complex 
relationships among them. Since very few policies ever seem to drop off the public 
agenda as more are added, congestion among those interested in various issues grow, the 
chances for accidental collisions increase, and the interaction tends to take on a 
distinctive group-life of its own in the Washington community. (Heclo, 1978, p. 97) 
 
Many of the new interest groups that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s were “public 
interest groups.” According to Berry (1977): “a public interest group is one that seeks a 
collective good, the achievement of which will not selectively and materially benefit the 
membership or activists of the organization”(p. 7). Scholars suggest that public interest groups 
play an important role in Washington politics due to the breadth and durability of their 
organizations, especially as some have developed into large organizations supported by huge 
membership and corresponding budgets (Berry & Wilcox, 2009). Examples of these 
organizations include the Environmental Defense Fund, the Children’s Defense Fund, the 
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Consumers Union and other often liberal groups, as well as professional organizations, such as 
the National Association of Social Workers which moved its headquarters from New York to 
Washington, D.C. 
Although public interest groups grew in size and influence, business groups remain the 
most influential interest groups operating in Washington, D.C. Business always had a large stake 
in governmental lobbying, but their Washington presence increased in response to government 
regulation which they generally opposed. “In the 1970s, the business community devoted 
considerable attention to building its political muscle…the idea that government relations was 
critical came to permeate the corporate world, creating expectations that executives would 
contribute to company PACs [political action committees] and to politicians, that lobbying was a 
cost of doing business, and that coordinated efforts could pay off” (Berry & Wilcox, 2009, p. 
30). Nevertheless, as business regulation declined under Republican control, the business 
community did not reduce their lobbying efforts making them major players in federal agenda 
setting and policy implementation (Berry & Wilcox, 2009).  
Although not to the same extent as business groups, think tanks also play an important 
role in Washington politics. Rich (2004) defines these organizations as “independent, non-
interest based, non-profit organizations that produce and principally rely on expertise and ideas 
to obtain support and to influence the policymaking process” (p. 11). Weaver (1989) suggests 
that think tanks play four major roles in the policy process. First, they serve as sources for policy 
ideas and he cites the role of The American Enterprise Institute (AEI), The Hoover Institution, 
and The Brookings Institution as championing the deregulation of domestic transportation 
policy. Secondly, they act as evaluators of policy proposals and of existing government policies 
as he suggests that “much think tank research is concerned less with dissemination of new 
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overall approaches to public policy than with the advancing and evaluating specific policy 
proposals” (p. 568). Thirdly, they also serve as a reservoir of personnel who are government 
experts and a place of employment for the key members of political parties that are not in power. 
Finally, think tanks and their members are called on by the media to serve as “experts” and 
“political pundits” based on their perceived issue expertise. 
Finally, nonprofit organizations play a passive role similar to interest groups. Although 
these groups usually act as diverse service providers rather than political actors, Berry suggests 
that they do “play political roles, albeit not as obviously or aggressively as other interest groups” 
(Berry, 2007, p. 235). Given the growth of the welfare state, the number of nonprofit 
organizations has dramatically increased. Since they have to register as 501(c)(3) organizations 
with the Internal Revenue Service, records indicate that in from the mid-1960s to 2003 the 
number of nonprofit organizations increased from 100,000 to 800,000 (Berry, 2007). In his 
survey of nonprofit organizations, Berry (2007) found that nonprofit leaders are uninformed of 
the laws that govern their group’s potential political activity and disinclined to engage in legal 
political activities. 
2.3B: Coalition evidence 
Early interest group literature suggested that interest groups would not work together and 
form coalitions (Olson, 1971; Salisbury, 1969; Truman, 1951). For instance Wilson (1973) wrote 
that, “autonomy gives to an association a stable claim to certain resources and thereby reduces 
uncertainty and lessens threats to survival” (p. 263). Similarly, Berry (1977) argued that it was in 
the best interest of an organized group to devote resources to efforts that enhanced its own 
reputation, rather than efforts that would make it appear less original. A study of agricultural 
interest groups argued that interest groups remain credible through creating narrow “issue 
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niches” (Browne, 1990). Group survival is dependent on self-proclaimed issue expertise. 
However, as a result of the explosion of interest groups and interest group coalitions in the 
1970s, political scientists began to reconsider and examine interest group behavior more closely.  
When diverse groups form an alliance they are in essence “expanding the scope of the 
conflict” (Schattschneider, 1960). In other words, conflict is the essence of politics. Therefore, 
individuals or groups that want to have their issue reach the public agenda must gain the 
attention and support of others to successfully reach their goal. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) 
build on this concept to argue that the increase in interest groups caused groups to secure the 
decreasing public resources brought on by the growing number of organized interests. Since the 
1970s groups have created alliances to gain access to a wider range of decision makers and to 
aggregate their members in order to appear more powerful (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).  
Hula (1999) expands these theories to argue that alliances offer groups a low-cost way of 
showing members or policymakers that they are active. His study of coalition formation among 
organized interests in Washington, D.C. suggests that different types of organized interests 
respond to different incentives to join coalitions. According to his research, groups that have 
policy-oriented goals join coalitions to reduce their resource expenditure, to shape the content of 
policy proposals, and to define the parameters of the issue debate. On the other hand, other types 
of groups join alliances to access the information available to coalition members. He explains 
that, “given the importance of timely information at all stages of the policy process, access to 
new sources of intelligence is a general requirement for group representatives” (Hula, 1999, p. 
124). 
Other studies assert the importance of the context in which organizations make decisions 
to form coalitions. Instead of taking it as a given that groups will act collectively, Hojnacki 
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(1997) conducted an empirical study to examine why and when organized interests join 
coalitions. She measures the probability of a group joining a coalition on five diverse issues. 
Using survey responses from a mailed questionnaire, she then modeled the probability of the 
interest group joining a coalition based on independent variables drawn from her survey. The 
study’s results suggest that the costs of joining an alliance outweigh membership benefits when a 
group’s interest in an issue is narrow and when potential allies signal that the organization will 
have little to contribute to a collective advocacy campaign. In contrast, the benefits outweigh the 
costs, when the coalition already has pivotal membership and when groups represent expressive 
interests or perceive a strong organized opposition. The validity of the study’s findings, however, 
is limited by its sampling-frame and low response rate.  
2.4: Conclusion 
Qualitative methodologists who practice historical research posit that time and sequence 
matter as a result of path dependence. Path dependence, sometimes called increasing returns, 
suggests that events occur due to a continuous feedback loop. “Initial moves in a particular 
direction encourage further movement along the same path. Over time, “‘the road not chosen’ 
becomes an increasingly distant, increasingly unreachable alternative” (Pierson, 2000, pp. 74-
75). Consequently, this chapter provided a cursory review of the important historical events and 
societal changes predating 1973 to contextualize the empirical portion of this dissertation. In 
order to understand the evolution of federal youth policy from 1973 to 2008, it is essential to 
have a sense of what came before since earlier events are in part responsible for future outcomes.  
In addition, this chapter provided important context as the types of interest groups 
operating in American politics and how those groups have changed over time. Furthermore, I 
included a brief literature review as to theories of why interest groups form coalitions. Since this 
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dissertation involves a critical exploration of the role of youth interest groups, it is necessary to 
contextualize the empirical findings presented in Chapter 4 in terms of the prior research. The 
next chapter reviews the data collection process and methodology, followed by the empirical 





Chapter 3: Data and methods 
The dissertation uses a historical methodological approach to analyze the presence of 
youth issues on the congressional agenda. It documents congressional attention to the five sub-
issues that comprise youth policy and empirically tests two hypotheses that may account for the 
change over time in the presence of youth issues on the congressional agenda. The research 
design required substantial data collection because there is no preexisting research that 
empirically analyzes federal youth policy and the interest groups involved in youth issues. Since 
youth policy does not fall within the bounds of one particular policy area it is difficult to identify 
groups that have lobbied for youth issues. Coupled with the lack of prior information on youth 
policy and the youth advocacy coalition, the research design was constructed to broaden rather 
than limit the population.  
Congressional hearings were chosen as the main source of data because they are the 
venue in which “lobbyists have their greatest influence” and present a snapshot of the important 
issues of the time (Cross, 2003). Congressional hearings are defined as a meeting or session of 
the Senate, House of Representatives, joint, or special committee of Congress. Hearings are 
usually open to the public and are held in order to obtain information and opinions on proposed 
legislation, conduct an investigation, or evaluate/oversee the activities of a government 
department or the implementation of a federal law. They may also be purely exploratory in 
nature intended to inform members of Congress about topics of current interest (U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2005).  
In Congress there are many types of committees (e.g. ad hoc, conference, select, special, 
standing, joint, and so forth) that are used for a variety of purposes. Two defining characteristics 
distinguish the basic types of committees: legislative authority (the right to receive and report 
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measures) and permanency (existing from one Congress to the next) (Deering & Smith, 1997). 
All committees have the power to collect information, but some lack the formal authority to draft 
and report legislation to their chamber. The four joint committees (economic, taxation, library, 
and printing) whose membership comprises both Representatives and Senators, with the 
chairmanship rotating between members of both chambers, have permanent status yet lack 
legislative authority. Select committees are formed to: highlight important policy issues, to study 
or investigate pressing problems, to coordinate the development of policy that overlaps the 
jurisdictions of several standing committees, and/or sometimes as a reward from party leaders to 
members who have done them favors (Deering & Smith, 1997). This study includes an analysis 
of all types of committees. 
Congressional committees have existed prior to the development of political parties, yet 
they are constantly being revised and reformed based on changes in partisanship and the policy 
agenda (Deering & Smith, 1997). In the past 60 years, these external pressures have led to 
numerous official and unofficial reviews by Congress of its institutional structures
6
 (Schneider, 
Campbell, Davis, & Palmer, 2003; Schneider, Davis, & Palmer, 2003). From the 1970s to the 
present, the congressional committee structure has oscillated from a decentralized to a 
centralized system (Deering & Smith, 1997). Furthermore, congressional committees often 
change names and are created and abolished over time. Given the constancy of congressional 
reform, it is essential to study federal youth policy with a longitudinal approach.  
3.1: Prior research on the politics of Congress 
Given that this dissertation examines the nature of congressional attention to youth 
policy, I examined the prior research on the politics of Congress to support the research design 
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 For a review of the history of congressional reform see Deering & Smith, 1997; Schneider, Campbell, Davis, & 
Palmer, 2003; and Schneider, Davis, & Palmer, 2003. 
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for this study. The United States Congress is a dynamic institution as a result of the obvious fact 
that members come and go based on electoral preferences, but also due to Congress’ self-created 
institutional changes in regard to how it organizes itself and the legislative process. 
3.1A: Committee theory: Information 
Many scholars have studied congressional hearings in an effort to understand their role in 
the legislative process. Some scholars find that congressional hearings are a strategic venue used 
by congressional members to skew information and shape the policy conversation. For instance, 
hearings are often held because committee chairs want to promote their own agenda and they 
invite witnesses who can help facilitate this effort (Leyden, 1995; Talbert, Jones, & 
Baumgartner, 1995). In Huitt’s (1954) case study of the Senate’s Committee on Banking and 
Currency in spring 1946, he described the hearings over the question of extending price control 
as “a public platform for opposing groups with which the senators identified” (Huitt, 1954, p. 
365). He continues, “A great deal of information was received from interested groups, which the 
senators accepted or rejected in accordance with their preconceived notions of the facts” (Huitt, 
1954, p. 365). Furthermore, Oleszek (1989) suggests that members enter hearings not only with 
prepared questions for witnesses, but also with a list of expected answers that have been derived 
from extended work on the part of their staff with witnesses. 
Other researchers, however, find that congressional hearings are used for more objective 
information gathering. DeGregorio (1992) finds that a committee chair convenes a hearing to 
gain insight and information about the consequences of various policy proposals, or simply to 
learn why a problem exists in the first place. In such instances the chair is more likely to instruct 
staffers to invite witnesses with diverse points of view. The minority party is given one day to 
hear testimony from witnesses of their choosing, but the majority party is afforded many days in 
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which to hear testimony from their selected witnesses. Although legislation that emerges from 
congressional hearings must be voted on by the House of Representatives and Senate and is 
subject to further negotiation and revision, the hearings are particularly important since it is at 
this stage that many members shape their opinions on issues through exposure to testimony and 
field visits in hearings (Cross, 2003). 
Furthermore, elected officials seek out information in congressional hearings in order to 
protect their self-interest (i.e.: re-election and peer respect) (Fenno, 1973). “Generally speaking, 
legislators seek two types of information: political information that enlightens their 
understanding of the electoral consequences of their decisions, and policy information that 
enlightens their understanding of the consequences of policy change” (Leyden, 1995). Smith’s 
(1984) empirical study of the lobbying activities of the National Education Association found 
that members of Congress look to interest groups to help interpret the consequences of their 
decisions. According to Smith, "The aim is to show the position favored by the advocate is also 
one consistent with the goals of the members—either by shaping the members' personal 
understandings of the consequences or by providing members with acceptable explanations of 
their positions" (Smith, 1984, p. 47). 
Diermeier and Feddersen (2000), however, take a different angle and argue that 
information obtained in hearings may not be informative to committees, but rather are more 
useful in providing crucial information to the floor. They find “that if hearings are informative 
and costly then committees both specialize and hold hearings for a wide range of prior beliefs 
about likely policy outcomes” (Diermeier & Feddersen, 2000, p. 59).  
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3.1B: Committee theory: Jurisdiction 
In addition to examining the flow of information through congressional committees, other 
political scientists have studied the role of formal and informal jurisdiction in the politics of 
Congress. Jurisdiction refers to the issues each committee has the authority to review, or in other 
words its “turf.” King (1994) quotes a congressional staffer as saying, “Jurisdiction boils down to 
whether you’ll have a seat at the table when important decisions are being made. If you’re not at 
the table, you’re a nobody” (p. 48). 
Another way to conceptualize jurisdiction is as a rational division of labor. On the one 
hand it may make sense to have zero overlap among committees in terms of their jurisdiction. 
That way, each committee can specialize and act as the “expert” on a given topic. On the other 
hand, there is the parallel problem of the continual arrival of new issues, such as those brought 
on by technological advances, demographic changes and so forth. The fundamental dilemma that 
this poses is that members of Congress are elected to represent the diverse issues affecting their 
constituencies and as such it is not in their best interest to specialize too narrowly. This conflict 
is at the heart of the issue of jurisdiction. 
King (1994) distinguishes two types of jurisdiction: statutory and common law. Statutory 
jurisdiction refers to the legal jurisdiction recorded in the congressional rules. As such, most 
committees have between ten to 15 specific issues listed under the jurisdiction in the rules. 
Consequently, it is clear which issue goes to which committee for review. Common law 
jurisdiction, however, is a much more political process. King (1994) explains: 
When jurisdictionally ambiguous bills are introduced, they still have to be referred to one 
committee (or sometimes several committees) within 24 hours...the House and Senate 
parliamentarians—unelected but powerful clerks—refer bills and resolve jurisdictional 
ambiguities. These referrals establish binding precedents for all future bills on the same 




As a result, entrepreneurial committee chairs are active in guarding their legislative turf from 
rival committees and additionally work to expand their jurisdiction through claiming ownership 
of new issues as they arise. In essence jurisdiction is a political game because for every 
committee that wins jurisdiction over a new issue, there are many more committees that lose in 
the continual conflict over turf.  
As the number of issues has risen over time, Congress has modified the jurisdictional 
structure. One solution has been to redefine existing issues more narrowly in order to prevent 
issues spilling over beyond the jurisdiction of a single committee. Consequently, committee 
jurisdictions have become increasingly specific and narrow based on the language of statutory 
authority, executive agency activities, or clauses of the tax code rather than jurisdiction based on 
common sense and broad policy terms. Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod (2000) give the 
example of health care policy in the 105
th
 House of Representatives to illustrate this 
phenomenon:  
The Commerce Committee is given authority over “health and health care facilities, 
except health care supported by payroll deductions” (Rule X-e-3), which goes to Ways 
and Means because of its traditional control over Social Security issues. This reaction to 
the jurisdiction problem leads to problems of coordination since policies created by a 
variety of different statutes may coexist in a single policy area. It helps explain some 
long-standing contradictions of government policy as well. (p. 327) 
 
This lack of coordination in Congress has been particularly problematic for the advancement of 
the youth policy agenda, which will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
To document the change in jurisdictional clarity in the post-war period, Baumgartner, 
Jones, and MacLeod (2000) analyzed a dataset of all congressional hearings held between 1947 
and 1994. They calculated Herfindahl indexes, a measure used by economists to assess market 
concentration, but used more recently used by political scientists to assess jurisdictional 
concentration (Hardin, 1998; Lowery & Gray, 1998). Following their lead, I also make use of 
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Herfindahl indexes in this dissertation, which will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter. In their study, Baumgartner et al. (2000) use Herfindahl scores to summarize the degree 
to which a single committee dominates (a high score) or shares authority with a large number of 
rivals (low score) and the extent to which each committee focuses its attention on a single issue 
(a high score) or spreads its attention across many topics (low score). Through their analysis, 
they find that committees in both chambers spread their attention more broadly than in the early 
post-war period illustrating a decline in jurisdictional clarity as a result of increasing issue 
complexity and the institutional resources available to study issues. Regardless of these issues, 
they also found that committees continue to specialize given these constraints. Given the battle 
of jurisdiction, the structure of congressional committees cannot be studied as a static institution, 
and as such this study uses a longitudinal approach of 35 years to understand how Congress has 
approached youth issues, rather than a cross-sectional approach which may be biased based on 
the politics of Congress at any particular point in time. 
3.2: Data  
To examine federal youth policy I created and analyzed a database of all congressional 
hearings on youth issues held from 1973 to 2008. In addition, I conducted a small number of 
interviews with members of the youth advocacy coalition to contextualize the findings from my 
content analysis of the congressional hearings. The following sections review the data collection 
process. 
3.2A: Timeframe 
I purposely selected the period from 1973-2008 since it is the most active period to date 
of domestic youth policy. This 35 year time period includes many political and social structural 
changes in the United States. For example during this timeframe the federal government 
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fluctuated in its methods of mandating and funding social policy, indicated by the allocation of 
categorical grants, that specifically ask state and local governments to follow federal regulation 
versus block grants, that provide significant leeway in state allocation of federal funds (Conlan, 
1998; Peterson, 1995). Moreover, during this era interest groups grew in size and importance, 
with some scholars arguing that interest groups surpassed political parties as society’s dominant 
political institutions (Lowi, 1967, 1979). The flourishing public-interest movement in the 1970s 
and the government’s commitment to a wider range of services and higher levels of spending 
never before seen in the nation’s peacetime history are important hallmarks of this period 
(Jillson, 1994).  
Furthermore, I purposely selected the specific years 1973 and 2008 as the beginning and 
end points of the study. The Vietnam War, characterized by the youth-led anti-war movement, 
ended in 1973. I chose to begin the timeframe after the Vietnam War, as to not confuse factors 
specific to the youth-led anti-war movement with more general institutional issues impacting the 
formation of federal youth policy. The study concludes in 2008 with the election of President 
Barack Obama which signified a substantial change in political regime
7
. 
This time frame also satisfies the recommendation of many public policy scholars who 
argue that a minimum of 20 years is necessary to study the politics of policymaking in order to 
understand “the impact of a variety of socioeconomic conditions and to accumulate scientific 
knowledge about a problem” (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Derthick & Quirk, 1985; Eisner, 
1993; Sabatier, 2007). Given that so little is known about federal youth policy, this dissertation 
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uses a 35 year period to better understand the change over time rather than the minimum 
recommendation of 20 years.  
3.2B: Data collection: Congressional hearings 
All data collected were found through the ProQuest Congressional database.
8
 This 
database provides information about individual hearings which are generally grouped through a 
“legislative history.” Each legislative history provided by ProQuest includes an abstract of the 
public law, bibliographic citations, controlled vocabulary subject indexing, and a list of all 
hearings related to the bill. ProQuest also provides a unique Congressional Information Service 
(Wong, Shen, Anagnostopoulos, & Rutledge) Legislative History number. Each hearing in the 
ProQuest database includes important information, such as: the title of the hearing, date, 
committee, and the listing of each testimony
9
, as well, as a unique CIS number that links with the 
CIS Legislative History number. Furthermore, for each testimony it also lists all the associated 
witnesses that participated at the hearing. The majority of hearings included in the database had 
several testimonies that each included many witnesses.  
To facilitate data analysis, I created a database including all information relevant to the 
laws, hearings, testimonies, and witnesses
10
. The database provides a rich dataset compiling 
information that is not currently available in any one source. The database includes a four-tiered 
structure to allow all the information to be included. The first level includes all information 
relevant to the legislative history: the name and public law number, CIS number, date, enacted 
bills and statutes, congressional session, and the summary of the legislation. The second level 
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 In January 2010, ProQuest acquired the database from LexisNexis and changed its name accordingly. The database 
can be found at: http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp. 
9
 Testimony refers to a panel of witnesses that are grouped together to give information to the committee. A 
testimony can range from one or two witnesses to many witnesses.  
10
 The database was created with the help of Bob Scott head of the Columbia University Libraries Digital 
Humanities Center (formally called the Electronic Text Service). 
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provides the information related to the hearings itself: the title of the hearing, CIS number, the 
date(s) held, the name of the committee(s) and subcommittee(s) that convened it, the location(s) 
of the hearing, the law associated with the hearing, and a summary of the topic discussed. Next, 
the third-level of the database contains the testimony information: the name of the hearing and 
related law, the CIS number and testimony number, the date held, and the statement and 
discussion. Finally, the fourth-tier of the database includes information about all the witnesses 
testifying at a hearing: the first and last name of the witness, their title and institution, as well as 
any additional institutions they may be representing, and the hearing and law associated with the 
testimony.  
Data collection began with a review of the Congressional Research Service’s (CRS) 2007 
report Vulnerable Youth: Background and Policies (Fernandes, 2007). The CRS report includes 
45 federal programs designed to serve or research vulnerable youth primarily between the ages 
of 10-24 (Fernandes, 2007). All authorizing legislation and subsequent reauthorizations found in 
the report were searched using the Legislative History function and all the relevant hearings were 
included in the database. The CRS report was a useful way to search the congressional hearings 
because of the inconsistent age parameters federal youth programs use for eligibility 
requirements discussed in Chapter 1. All of the reauthorizations after 1973 of the laws described 
in Chapter 2 were included in the initial search criteria. 
While the CRS report identified 45 programs for vulnerable youth, other federal reports 
using broader definitions of youth have identified many more programs designed to serve 
disadvantaged youth. A 1996 General Accountability Office Report cataloged 131 programs 
targeting individuals aged five to 24 years old who, due to certain characteristics or experiences, 
were statistically more likely than other youth to encounter legal, social, financial, educational, 
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emotional, and health problems in the future (U.S. General Accounting Office, March 1996). 
Similarly, the 2002 White House Task Force for Disadvantaged Youth developed a Federal 
Youth Programs Survey that asked all the federal departments to identify and provide details 
regarding any programs they operated in FY 2002 that targeted disadvantaged youth between the 
ages of 5-17. The Task Force identified 335 federal programs that served or addressed 
disadvantaged youth in FY 2002 (Executive Office of the President, October 2003). Although 
these reports present a much larger body of federal programs, they do so through using a 
definition of youth that includes younger children. Since this dissertation uses ages 16-24 to 
define youth
11
, the findings from the General Accountability Office Report and the White House 
Task Force for Disadvantaged Youth were inappropriate sources to guide the data collection 
since they define youth as beginning at age five. The CRS report is not perfect because it uses 
the age range of 10 to 24, but since that includes early adolescence, as described in Chapter 2, it 
provided the best available list of legislation in which to guide the data collection process. 
However, the list of programs and accompanying public laws provided in the CRS report 
was not exhaustive, most notably excluding large block grants that states might use to serve 
young people. Due to the variability in the use of block grants for youth issues, however, they 
were not included in the analysis. Nevertheless, to reduce further selection bias, I also searched 
ProQuest Congressional for enacted laws that had not been funded and for hearings that 
ProQuest did not classify as belonging to a “legislative history.” All additional data were found 
through searching the ProQuest Congressional database using relevant search terms (see Table 
A2 in Appendix A). Examples of relevant legislative histories not included in the CRS report, 
but found through searching of the ProQuest database include, but are not restricted to: the Tom 
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Osborne Federal Youth Coordination Act (P.L. 109-365), the YouthBuild Transfer Act (P.L. 
109-281), and the Claude Pepper Young Americans Act (P.L. 101-501).  
Selection criteria regarding the hearings and legislative histories were purposively broad. 
As long as one testimony in the hearing was youth related, the hearing was included in the 
database and analysis and similarly a legislative history was included as long as one hearing was 
deemed relevant. This allowed for the inclusion of all possible youth hearings and the 
organizations testifying. Consequently, the database includes an over-sampling of hearings and 
organizations, but given the lack of previous knowledge on youth policy, the research design was 
constructed to broaden rather than limit the population. In sum, the database includes 107 laws 
(see Table A1 in Appendix A), 986 hearings, 3,389 separate testimonies, and 11,751 witnesses. 
The data were collected primarily between January and July 2010. 
3.2C: Data collection: Limitations of hearing data 
In 2011, the hearings and legislative histories included in the database were checked with 
the hearing information provided by the Policy Agenda Project (n.d.) to ensure that no relevant 
data had been missed. Although every attempt was made to find the population of congressional 
hearings on youth-related topics, it is still possible that hearings were omitted due to human error 
and upload delays by ProQuest. According to the ProQuest website, data are added on a monthly 
basis to its online system, which may account for the limited number of hearings found in more 
recent years. Furthermore, ProQuest is continuing to upload hearings and legislative hearings 
from all years included in this study. For instance, in December 2011, hearings on youth 
unemployment were added from 1979. According to the online record provided by ProQuest, the 
1979 hearings were only uploaded in November 2010, which was after the completion of the 
major data collection. Although every attempt has been made to ensure that all relevant hearings 
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are included, it is possible that some hearings and corresponding witness information are 
missing.  
3.2D: Data collection: Elite interviews 
To further understand federal youth policy during this timeframe, I also conducted a 
small number of interviews with youth policy elites (n = 5). Elites refer to people in decision-
making or leadership roles, or in other words, experts in the topic (Leech, 2002). Elite interviews 
are a useful technique because, “well-informed or influential people are unwilling to accept the 
assumptions with which the investigator starts; they insist on explaining to him [the investigator] 
how they see the situation, what the real problems are as they view the matter” (Dexter, 1970, 
pp. 6-7). Furthermore, elite interviews provide context and explanation that cannot be found 
through archival and internet research. Scholars have noted that the opaque nature of interest 
group behavior necessitates the use of primary accounts in interest group research (Cigler, 1991). 
For instance, while the process of government decision-making is available in the Congressional 
Record or the Federal Register, no such equivalent exists for interest group decisions (Hula, 
1999). 
Respondents were selected based on their knowledge of youth policy from 1973-2008, 
their activity in an advocacy organization, and their specific knowledge of particular policy areas 
that have produced coalition behavior. Participants varied in their area of expertise and 
involvement in federal youth policy. Of the five respondents, three were knowledgeable on all 
five sub-issues of youth policy, one was an education expert, and one was a workforce 
development/community service expert. Several respondents also had previous work experience 
on Capitol Hill and provided useful insider information into the workings of Congress and youth 
policy. Another respondent previously worked in the media covering youth issues and was able 
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to discuss the marketing of youth issues to the larger public. Four of the respondents were male 
and one was female. Although only five interviews were conducted, the combined expertise of 
the respondents provided essential information that helped to elucidate the congressional hearing 
data. 
In order to maximize the information provided by the interviews, questions were semi-
structured, that is, elites were asked mainly open-ended questions allowing respondents the 
opportunity to answer questions in some detail. Open-ended rather than close-ended questions 
were used since little is known about federal youth policy and the interviews primary purposes 
was to inform the history of the movement as well as the respondents’ actual views. 
Furthermore, open-ended questions maximize response validity and are generally preferred by 
elites (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). In addition, respondents were given preliminary findings 
from the congressional analysis prior to the interview and were probed as to why they thought 
certain patterns occurred in the data.  
Interviews were audio-recorded and notes were generated for each respondent. The notes 
were reviewed and analyzed following to identify themes and explanations for congressional 
hearing data. Direct quotes presented in Chapter 5 were transcribed from the audio recordings 
based on the research notes. 
3.3: Coding of congressional hearing data 
After all hearings were entered into the database, I coded each CIS hearing. The coding 
scheme used elements from the Policy Agendas Project (n.d.) and a classification system I 
refined from the CRS report to identify the subject of the hearing. These topics include: 
education, workforce development, criminal justice, social services, and public health. I selected 
these five categories based on the above-mentioned CRS report (Fernandes, 2007). Table 3.1 
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provides examples of topics that fell into each category. The categories are mutually exclusive. 
When a hearing contained information regarding more than one topic, it was coded for the 
predominant topic. Furthermore, I applied a series of coding rules in order to have consistency 
across the issue areas. For instance, topics on the issue of vocational education were coded as 
workforce development, whereas the topic of school lunch and nutrition education received the 
public health code.  
Table 3.1: Codes applied to congressional hearings 
Code Examples of topics included 
Workforce Development Job training, vocation education, adult 
education, school-to-work, community service, 
service learning 
Education K12 education, higher education, school 
dropout, child care, afterschool. 
Criminal Justice Illegal drugs and alcohol, sexual abuse, child 
pornography, child abuse, school violence 
Social Service Foster care, welfare reform, homeless youth, 
adoption 
Public Health Pregnancy and abortions, nutrition, suicide, 
violence in the media, abstinence education. 
 
Similarly, I coded each institution represented by a witness in the database as workforce, 
education, juvenile justice, social service, or public health—the same categories used to 
differentiate the different types of policy areas comprising youth policy. However, I enlarged the 
coding scheme to also include higher education, business, and other organizations (e.g. 
foundations, labor, multi-issue, and youth policy groups
12
), as well as separate codes for 
governmental institutions. Since the witnesses included a mixture of government and non-
governmental organizations, I applied two separate codes based on the organizational affiliation. 
                                                     
12
 Youth were included in the “other” category because of the small sample size. Many witnesses representing youth 
were captured in broader categories and very few fell into the youth category and not any other larger group. 
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When necessary I referenced the websites of organizations to determine the appropriate code. 




Table 3.2: Codes applied to witnesses 
Code Description 
Non-Governmental Organizations 
Workforce & Community Service Includes community service and mentoring (e.g. Girl Scouts, Big 
Brothers, Big Sisters), vocational education, adult literacy, technical 
schools (e.g. trade school), YouthBuild, and Conservation Corps. 
Education Includes general education, parent-teacher associations, child care, 
and child development organizations. 
Juvenile Justice Includes drug issues, sexual abuse, child pornography, school 
violence, child support, and organizations related to the legal 
system. 
Social Service Includes foster care, welfare reform, homeless, runaway, and 
missing children, adoption, child abuse, and child welfare groups. 
Public Health 
 
Includes any groups focused on pregnancy (including abortions), 
abstinence education, nutrition and school lunch, suicide, and 
violence in the media. 
Business Includes any businesses, business roundtables, or business 
advocacy groups, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce or a local 
affiliate. 
Higher Education Includes all colleges or universities, including community colleges, 
and any organization focused on financial aid for higher education. 
Other Includes general advocacy organizations (e.g. National Governors 
Association (NGA), The National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL), Children's Defense Fund (CDF)); philanthropic 
foundations; labor unions (e.g. AFL-CIO, American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), and National 
Education Association
13
 (NEA)); religious organization (e.g. 
churches, YMCA, Catholic Charities); and any other groups that 
were not mentioned in the above categories (e.g. media groups, 
sports teams, Association of Junior Leagues, American Association 
of Retired Persons (AARP), National Retired Teachers Association, 
camp or sports related) and so forth. 
Governmental Organizations 
Local Government Includes mayors, city councils, city bureaucrats, school boards
14
 
and, public libraries.   
State Government Includes governors, state legislatures, state bureaucrats, and state 
boards (e.g. Board of Regents, State Boards of Higher Education, 
and so forth). 
Federal Government Includes members of the federal government departments and 
divisions (e.g. U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of 
Education, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, General 
Accountability Office, Congressional Research Service and so 
forth). 
Congress Includes members of Congress and their staff. 
Native American Government Includes representatives of Native American Tribes and 
                                                     
13
 All labor unions were grouped together and not coded based on the industry of the workers they represent. 
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Court Includes judges, district attorneys, or court representative. 





After the database was constructed and coded, I ran descriptive statistics of the content of 
the hearings and organizations testifying to examine patterns over time. I also explored the data 
based on the Chamber of the hearing (e.g. Senate, House of Representatives, or a Joint 
committee), by Presidential term, and by political party and conducted t-tests and chi-square 
analyses to examine group differences. To examine the extent to which the different interest 
groups were concentrated by committee, a proxy measure consistent with whether groups 
worked together or independently, I also calculated Herfindahl indexes. Herfindahl indices of 
concentration are calculated by summing the squared proportions of a categorical classification 
of a population and then multiplying it by 100 for ease of interpretation.  
Following Hardin’s (1998) work on committee jurisdiction, other scholars have used the 
measure to assess jurisdictional concentration in Congress (Gray & Lowery, 1996; Poole & 
Rosenthal, 1997). For each type of non-governmental witness, I used a Herfindahl index to 
summarize the degree to which a type of witness dominated a committee (a high score) or 
worked with other types of groups (a low score)—what Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 
(2000) refer to as the Index of Overlap. I calculated the Index of Overlap for each type of non-
governmental witness during each congressional session from 1973 to 2008.  
The method for calculating the Index of Overlap is easiest to understand by examining an 
example. In every congressional session, there are K committees designated to hold hearings and 
                                                     
15
 Only 11 percent of the records in the K12 category are private schools. The majority of those are religious schools 
and schools for students with disabilities. 
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N witnesses that give testimony in front of the committees. To calculate the Index of Overlap I 
first determined the number of each type of witness category testifying in each committee per 
congressional session from the congressional hearing database I created for this study. For 
instance, Table 3.3 presents fictional data to elucidate the Herfindahl Index calculation. The table 
shows one individual from Witness category 1 testified in front of Committee A and five 
individuals from Witness category 2 also testified in front of Committee A during that same 
congressional session. Second, I calculated the proportion of each type of witness testifying per 
committee. I then squared each proportion before summing all the proportions to calculate the 
Index of Overlap. At this stage the Index which measures concentration at the interval level 
ranges from zero (illustrating a monopoly) to one (a completely non-concentrated situation). 
Finally, I multiplied the Index of Overlap by 100 for ease of interpretation. This procedure was 
followed for each congressional session included in the analysis. Using the data in Table 3.3 as a 









 = 0.30. I then multiplied 0.30 times 100 to get 30 which is the number presented 
in Table 3.3. 




Category 2 … 
Witness 
Category N Total Span 
Committee A 1 5 . 2 8 47 
Committee B 2 0 . 4 6 56 
Committee C 3 10 . 8 21 39 
… . . . .   
Committee K 4 5 . 2 11 37 
Total 10 20 . 16 46  
Index of Overlap 30 38 … 34   
 
After I calculated the Index of Overlap for each type of witness category in each 
congressional session, I combined all the data into a new table to examine the trends in the Index 
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of Overlap over time. I then took an average of each witness category’s Index of Overlap per 
congressional session. The averages of each non-governmental witness category were calculated 
to summarize the extent to which non-governmental actors of various types were concentrated in 
a committee each congressional session. Since the theoretical maximum for the sum of the 
Herfindahls is equal to the number of non-governmental witnesses, the average corresponds to 
dividing the sum of the Herfindahls by the number of witnesses. Each type of witness receives a 
score between zero and 100 for each congressional session to represent the degree to which that 
type of non-governmental witness is concentrated in a given committee. This information is 
presented in Table 4.8 in the next chapter. 
Given that the scale is from 0 to 100, I selected 50 as the arbitrator of high or low levels 
of concentration since there is no information in the literature to suggest the implication of 
certain scores of an Index of Overlap and corresponding concentration. This method posits that if 
different types of groups are diffusely represented within committees than the evidence is 
consistent with the notion of collaboration. This assumption is also explored through the elite 
interviews to ensure that it accurately captures the reality of coalitional behavior. If many 
witness categories receive a low score (under 50) it will be an indication that they may be 
working together because they would be testifying in various committees on a diffuse range of 
topics. If witness categories, however, receive high scores (above 50) it will be a sign that they 
may be working independently because they are concentrated in a committee. Since the 
Herfindahl Index is a measure of concentration, it is being used in this analysis as a proxy 




To document and analyze the changing nature of federal youth policy from 1973 to 2008, 
this study required an extensive data collection process. Congressional hearings were the main 
source of data collected because they represent an objective moving picture of the important 
national issues of the time. Data collection included the creation of a database including 107 
laws, 986 hearings, 3,389 separate testimonies, and 11,751 witnesses. Since I examined the topic 
over 35 years, moreover, the data provided a longitudinal perspective of the policy area. 
Furthermore, elite interviews were conducted to gain insight into the evolution of federal youth 
policy in a way that the congressional hearings could not. Combined, the study includes a rich 
and diverse set of data from which to make analytical claims as to why youth policy emerged on 




Chapter 4: Findings 
This chapter provides empirical evidence documenting the presence of youth policy, 
comprised of the five main sub-issues of criminal justice, education, public health, social service, 
and workforce, on the congressional agenda and the corresponding interest groups that 
participated in youth hearings from 1973 to 2008. Data are presented in section 4.1 that describe 
the change over time in the number and type of youth congressional hearings, as well as the 
committees that hold the hearings and the political party in control of the legislature. Section 4.2 
then presents empirical data on the witnesses that testified at the hearings based on their 
organizational affiliation. In addition, information provided by the elite interviews is interspersed 
to explicate the findings.  
Together these empirical data test the two hypotheses presented in Chapter 1. The first 
hypothesis, titled the external events hypothesis, suggests that the change in attention Congress 
gave youth issues was the result of policy entrepreneurs reacting to changing environmental 
conditions. The second hypothesis, entitled the internal actors hypothesis, suggests that internal 
political actors, such as congressional leaders and interest groups were the primary actors 
responsible for facilitating the presence of youth issues on the congressional agenda. This 
hypothesis places less emphasis on the changing environmental conditions; rather, it asserts that 
it was the internal actors themselves that strategically pushed for more attention to youth issues. 
Data to support the external events hypothesis would include examples of policy entrepreneurs 
acting upon external events that corresponded to an increase in hearings related to that topic. On 
the other hand, the internal actors hypothesis would be supported by evidence that interest 
groups representing the various subtopics of youth policy would testify together in front of 
congressional committees, even if the committee’s jurisdiction was not the interest group’s 
primary target. Analyses testing the hypotheses are presented in sections 4.3 and 4.4. In sum, this 
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chapter elucidates why the sub-issues that comprise youth policy were more or less prevalent on 
the congressional agenda over the 35 years included in this dissertation. 
4.1: Hearings 
To understand the history of youth issues on the congressional agenda, data are 
aggregated by congressional session to examine trends over time. The data are analyzed by the 
subject of the hearing by major topical area, the chamber and committee holding the hearing, and 
the political party in control of each chamber.  
4.1A: Overall trends 
Congress held 986 youth hearing from 1973 to 2008 characterized by considerable 
variation in the number of hearings held per congressional session as depicted in Table 4.1 and 
the bar graph in Graph 4.1. As the graph and table show, the data are characterized by various 
peaks and valleys and do not illustrate a clear relationship between the number and type of 
hearing and change over time. For instance, some years are marked by a large number of 
hearings (e.g. the 102
nd
 Congress from 1991-1992 held 97 hearings), whereas other sessions 
include very few hearings (e.g. the 107
th
 Congress from 2001-2002 only held 34 hearings). On 
average Congress held 55 hearings per session, with a median of 51 hearings per session.  
To put youth hearings in perspective, I compared the total number of hearings held per 
session to the total number of congressional hearings during the same session identified from the 
Policy Agenda Project.
16
 My calculations show that the 986 youth hearings held in Congress 
during the study period represent 1.70 percent of the total 58,144 hearings held. This information 
                                                     
16
 Data provided in the Policy Agenda Project (www.policyagendas.org) were originally collected by Frank R. 
Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 
and 0111611, and were distributed through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. 
Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here. 
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is also presented in the line graph in Graph 4.1, which shows that youth hearings represent one to 
three percent of all congressional hearings each session (Author’s calculation). The data show 
that even in years with large numbers of youth hearings, these issues never have a prominent 
space on the congressional agenda. Furthermore, the pattern of the percentage of hearings closely 
mimics the pattern of the total number of hearings. The only exception is the increase in the 
percentage of total hearings in the last year of data (shown by the line graph), which is larger 
than the increase in the number of total hearings presented in the bar graph. This is most likely 
the result of incomplete data on the total number of congressional hearings, discussed in Chapter 
3, due to a delay in the publication of all congressional hearings held during that session. The 
implications of this finding will be discussed in further detail in the final chapter of the 
dissertation. 
4.1B: Content of hearings 
An examination of the content of each hearing held clearly shows a hierarchical order in 
terms of the number of youth hearings held each session based on subtopic. Within this 
hierarchy, education is clearly the most popular sub-issue with almost one-third of the hearings 
included in the database focusing on education related topics (n = 280). Conversely, only 15 
percent of the hearings covered workforce development issues (n = 145) and 16 percent were on 
social service issues (n = 155), which were the two smallest groups. The other issues each 
represented approximately 40 percent of the sample with criminal justice representing 24 percent 
(n = 232) and public health 18 percent (n = 174) of the hearings included in the database. This 
information is displayed in both Table and Graph 4.1, as well as in Table 4.2. 
Examining the data longitudinally reveals that unequal attention was paid to the various 
youth sub-issues over time. For example, even though youth hearings are held most frequently 
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on education issues, the data also shows that during some sessions Congress did not actually 
devote much time to education issues. This is most pronounced in the 97
th
 Congress when the 
number of education hearings was zero. In addition, although workforce is the least frequent sub-
topic on the congressional youth agenda, in the early 1980s workforce development issues (e.g. 
the 97
th
 Congress) were actually the most prominent of youth issues on the congressional agenda. 
 












1973-1974 93 15 13 10 13 13 64 
1975-1976 94 9 4 16 11 11 51 
1977-1978 95 12 2 11 3 8 36 
1979-1980 96 6 14 9 3 11 43 
1981-1982 97 11 0 7 8 22 48 
1983-1984 98 14 7 10 8 10 49 
1985-1986 99 10 35 13 10 7 75 
1987-1988 100 12 11 9 18 6 56 
1989-1990 101 11 12 14 9 6 52 
1991-1992 102 19 48 14 13 3 97 
1993-1994 103 6 17 10 8 11 52 
1995-1996 104 10 8 4 12 9 43 
1997-1998 105 12 35 3 4 10 64 
1999-2000 106 21 36 9 9 1 76 
2001-2002 107 16 7 5 2 4 34 
2003-2004 108 10 18 11 7 8 54 
2005-2006 109 21 9 9 6 1 46 
2007-2008 110 17 4 10 11 4 46 
Total  232 280 174 155 145 986 
 
Given education’s independent rise on the federal agenda over this period (Cross, 2003; 
McGuinn, 2006), it is not surprising that education-related hearings represent the largest 
proportion of youth hearings. When asked why education received the most federal attention one 
of the policy elites interviewed commented: “K-12 education is the thousand pound gorilla and, 
out of necessity, that’s the place where we touch every child in this country.” Another 
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respondent confirmed the data showing youth workforce programs as receiving the lowest 
amount of federal attention.  
Youth employment programs tend to get a fairly low amount of attention compared to 
other workforce issues… We came out of the last recession and found that while the 
upswing in the economy made every sector of America better off, it did nothing to bring 
the status of young people, especially young black males, back up and we’ve failed to 
have our policy set up so that we come out of economic downturns and have young 
people protected and supported.  
 
All respondents interviewed agreed that of the five sub-issues comprising youth policy, 
education was the most prevalent and workforce development the least represented issue on the 
youth congressional agenda.  
The data also suggest an inverse relationship between the number of social service 
hearings and the number of workforce hearings (See Graph 4.1). When there were more social 
service hearings, the data suggest that there tended to be less workforce hearings and vice versa. 
These types of hearings often addressed issues of poverty from different perspectives (i.e.: 
entitlements versus job preparation); therefore, it is not surprising that as one issue’s intensity 
increases the other declines. After the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994, moreover, there 
is a general decline in the number of hearings focused on social service, workforce development, 
and public health issues. Conversely, there was an increase in the number of criminal justice 
hearings during this same period. These patterns may suggest the use of the second degree of 
power—the use of power to block issues from the agenda—by Congressional Republicans to 
prevent certain domestic social policy issues from the agenda. The implications of this finding 
are discussed later in this chapter. 
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4.1C: Chamber of hearings 
In terms of the location of the youth-related hearings, 62 percent were held in the House 
of Representatives (n = 609), 38 percent were sponsored by the Senate (n = 372), and less than 
one percent of the hearings were held by the Joint Economic Committee (n = 5). Analyzing the 
subtopic of hearing by chamber illustrates a fairly similar breakdown of the overall sample, 
except that the House of Representatives held more education hearings and less criminal justice 
hearings compared to the Senate. Table 4.2 presents the number and type of hearing by chamber.  
 
Table 4.2: Type and percent of youth hearing by chamber (n = 986) 





Criminal Justice 232 123 109 0 23.53 20.20 29.30 
Education 280 190 90 0 28.40 31.20 24.19 
Public Health 174 101 72 1 17.65 16.58 19.35 
Social Service 155 98 57 0 15.72 16.09 15.32 
Workforce 145 97 44 4 14.71 15.93 11.83 
Total 986 609 372 5 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Table 4.3: Percent of youth hearings based on political party in control of governmental branch
17
 
Type of Hearing 
House of Representatives*** 
(n = 609) 
Senate 
(n = 372) 
White House* 













Criminal Justice 14.9 30.2 29.5 29.1 22.5 23.9 
Education 29.0 35.4 21.0 29.1 34.9 25.8 
Public Health 20.2 9.9 18.8 20.3 14.1 19.1 
Social Services 16.9 14.6 18.8 10.1 13.0 16.8 
Workforce 19.1 9.9 12.1 11.5 15.5 14.4 
* p < .05 *** p < .001 
 
Statistical analyses also suggest that the political party in control of the legislature and the 
executive branch is associated with the number and type of youth related hearings held in 
Congress, as presented in Table 4.3. In the House of Representatives, approximately 20 percent 
                                                     
17
 Although the design was intended to collect the population of hearings, given the limitations discussed in Chapter 
3, I conducted significance testing in case there remains missing data.  
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of Democrat controlled hearings focused on public health and workforce issues, compared to 
roughly 10 percent of Republican controlled hearings on the same topics (p < .001). Conversely, 
30 percent of Republican controlled hearings were on criminal justice issues, compared to only 
15 percent when the Democrats controlled the chamber (p < .001). These findings show that the 
political party controlling the House of Representatives is associated with the content of youth 
hearings held. There was, however, no statistically significant relationship between the party in 
control of the Senate and the type of hearings held. With the exception of hearings on education 
and workforce developmental issues, when Republicans control the White House, Congress held 
more hearings on criminal justice, public health, and social service issues (p < .05). (See Table 
B1 in Appendix B for a breakdown of the political party in control of the legislative and 
executive branches of government during each congressional session). 
 This finding highlights importance differences in the two chambers of the U.S. Congress. 
Since Senators serve longer terms they are theoretically less susceptible to changes in public 
opinion compared to Representatives who face reelection every two years. As a result of their 
constant need to win reelection, members of the House of Representatives may be more likely to 
adhere to “issue ownership,” meaning that certain political parties usually gravitate towards 
certain issues more than others (Petrocik, Benoit, & Hansen, 2003). Holian (2004) explains how 
traditionally, “Democrats own issues including social welfare (Social Security and Medicare), 
women’s issues, and issues related to groups in society (e.g., rich vs. poor). Republicans own 
such issues as those related to big government, civil and social order (crime- and traditional 
values-related issues), and national defense” (p. 97).  
The variation in issue ownership found in this study therefore mimics the larger trends 
found in American politics, with House Republicans holding considerably more criminal justice 
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hearings compared to Democrats. Similarly, when the Democrats controlled the House of 
Representatives they held more hearings on traditionally liberal issues (e.g., public health, social 
services, and workforce) compared to Republicans. The issue of education, however, transcends 
the liberal/conservative dichotomy. Although, education was traditionally considered to be a 
liberal issue, over the course of the 20
th
 century it evolved into a bipartisan issue exemplified by 
both Democrats and Republicans supporting No Child Left Behind in 2001 and subsequent 
policy convergence within education (Howell, Peterson, & West, 2011; McGuinn, 2006).  
Across the hearings, the House Committee on Education and Labor (n = 344) and the 
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) (n = 196) held the most 
hearings in each chamber. The Senate Committee on Judiciary (n = 71) and the House 
Committee on Ways and Means (n = 62) also held a considerable number of hearings. Tables 4.4 
and 4.5 provide the number of hearings by type for each committee longitudinally, separated by 
chamber. As the tables show, with the exception of the major committees that hold hearing on 
youth issues, the remainder of the committees are rather erratic in the number of hearings they 
hold each session. In general while these committees hold one or two hearings every few 
sessions, they do not consistently hold hearings on youth issues.  
Although committees in the House and Senate may have similar names, they do not 
always have similar jurisdiction. For instance in the Senate the HELP committee deals with 
health issues, but in the House it is not the Education and Labor Committee, which is generally 
seen as the counterpart to the HELP committee, but rather the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce that handles health issues. Similarly, school lunch falls under the purview of the 
House Education and Labor Committee, but the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry. One former staffer of the House Education and Labor Committee suggested that 
67 
 
“depending on how you define youth, you enter government in different ways. It is such a large 
topic with so many different aspects and it is affected by congressional jurisdiction. There is not 
a unity to it and by its nature it is going to be difficult to deal with.” Consequently, there is a 
wide variety of committees listed in Table B2 (see Appendix B for more information) which 
presents the frequency and name of all the committees that held youth hearings from 1973 to 
2008, categorized by the current name of each committee
18
 
Given the importance of the chairman of the committee, I also explored the relationship 
between the chairman and the number and type of hearings for the House Committee on 
Education and Labor and the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions since 
both committees held the largest number of hearings in their respective chambers. Tables B3 and 
B4 in Appendix B provide a listing of the chairmen and their political affiliation of both 
committees from 1973 to 2008. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the committee chairman, like the 
CEO of a company, sets the tone for the committee and determines the number and content of 
hearings.  
T-tests analyzing the political party of the chairmen and the total number of hearing per 
congressional session and the number of hearings of each type did not have a statistically 
significant result. When Republicans controlled the HELP committee they held an average of ten 
hearings every congressional session and the Democrats held an average of 12 hearings every 
session when they controlled the Senate. The House Education and Labor Committee held an 
average of 19 hearings every session regardless of the chairman’s political party. Furthermore, 
data from these committees show that there were congressional sessions were only a few of the 
youth sub-issues were on the agenda. For example, neither committee held any education 
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 Since congressional committees frequently changed names over the period included in this study, I refer to the 
committees by their current name. See Appendix B for more information. 
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hearings in the 95
th
 (1977-1978) and 97
th
 (1981-1982) Congresses and the HELP committee also 
failed to hold education hearings in the 98
th
 Congress (1983-1984). Nonetheless, there were 14 
education hearings held between the two committees in the 96
th
 Congress (1979-1980). 






































































































Education & Labor 18 14 7 20 23 15 35 18 7 45 18 14 30 31 10 21 8 10 344 
Ways & Means 0 0 0 1 3 1 3 3 4 5 6 9 2 7 3 5 3 7 62 
Oversight & 
Government Reform 
2 1 0 0 0 1 4 0 2 0 0 1 3 8 4 5 10 1 42 
Children, Youth, & 
Families, Select 
0 0 0 0 0 12 6 10 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40 
Judiciary 0 1 3 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 4 6 5 6 7 38 
Energy & Commerce 2 3 4 2 2 1 3 0 2 2 1 0 1 2 2 1 4 3 35 
Appropriations 1 1 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 
Budget 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Small Business 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 5 
Natural Resources 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 7 
Population, Select 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Agriculture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Financial Services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 
Narcotics Abuse & 
Control, Select 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Science, Space, & 
Technology 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Crime, Select 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 














































Health, Education, Labor, 
& Pensions 
22 17 8 10 9 8 16 8 18 14 13 10 16 9 4 9 3 2 196 
Judiciary 4 8 3 2 7 8 2 2 1 7 3 5 5 2 1 2 2 7 71 
Indian Affairs 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 4 2 1 3 0 0 7 1 0 4 0 25 
Finance 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 0 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 3 3 21 
Appropriations 2 0 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 2 21 
Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs 
4 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 2 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 17 
Commerce, Science, 
Transportation 
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 5 
Budget 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
Energy & Natural 
Resources 
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 
Banking, Housing, & 
Urban Affairs 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Agriculture, Nutrition, & 
Forestry 
1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Small Business & 
Entrepreneurship 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 





In addition to the content of the hearings, I also collected and categorized information 
about the witnesses who testified at the 986 congressional hearings included in the database. The 
data are disaggregated based on the types of organizations the witnesses represented, which were 
reviewed in Table 3.2 in the previous chapter. The presence of many non-governmental groups 
testifying before Congress is important since American government is premised on the 
fundamental belief that organized interests must be able to exist freely. Organized interest groups 
remain the primary channel of access through which citizens voice their opinions to elected 
officials. Furthermore, it is through organized interests that political issues are often formed and 
put on the political agenda (Berry & Wilcox, 2009). 
 
Table 4.6: Subtotals and percentages of governmental and non-governmental witnesses by 







Total % Gov. % NGO 
1973-1974 93 386 601 987 39.11 60.89 
1975-1976 94 253 280 533 47.47 52.53 
1977-1978 95 218 270 488 44.67 55.33 
1979-1980 96 329 658 987 33.33 66.67 
1981-1982 97 207 282 489 42.33 57.67 
1983-1984 98 216 473 689 31.35 68.65 
1985-1986 99 347 747 1,094 31.72 68.28 
1987-1988 100 287 420 707 40.59 59.41 
1989-1990 101 249 356 605 41.16 58.84 
1991-1992 102 289 830 1,119 25.83 74.17 
1993-1994 103 195 355 550 35.45 64.55 
1995-1996 104 269 333 602 44.68 55.32 
1997-1998 105 169 358 527 32.07 67.93 
1999-2000 106 246 280 526 46.77 53.23 
2001-2002 107 58 99 157 36.94 63.06 
2003-2004 108 84 197 281 29.89 70.11 
2005-2006 109 132 143 275 48.00 52.00 
2007-2008 110 131 177 308 42.53 57.47 
Total  4,065 6,859 10,924 37.21 62.79 




From 1973 to 2008, 10,924 individuals representing organized groups testified at youth-
related congressional hearings.
19
 Slightly less than 40 percent represented local, state, or federal 
government (n = 4,065) and over 60 percent of witnesses represented non-governmental groups 
(n = 6,859). Table 4.6 presents the total number and percentage of governmental and non-
governmental witnesses per congressional session. In addition, Graph B3 in Appendix B displays 
the raw numbers in bar graph form. The evidence presented shows that the 60/40 ratio of non-
governmental to government witnesses holds true in most congressional sessions included in the 
analysis. The 102
nd
 Congress from 1991-1992 is a notable exception when there were many 
more non-governmental witnesses than in other years. This corresponds to the session with the 
highest number of hearings due to the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. Further 
investigation of the data shows that it is an increase in higher education representatives that is 
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 This excludes the 827 witnesses representing themselves personally rather than a larger organization. Individuals 
were excluded from the analysis because the study is interested in the role of interest groups and governmental 
agents in the creation of youth policy. This methodological choice is explained in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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Table 4.7: Frequency and percent of governmental and non-governmental witnesses representing 
institutions testifying at youth-related congressional hearings, 1973-2008 (n = 10,924). 
 
Type of Witness Frequency Percent 
Governmental 
Federal Government 1,042 9.5 
Local Government 1,000 9.2 
State Government 969 8.9 
Congress 563 5.2 
Indian Government 166 1.5 
K12 205 1.9 
Court 120 1.1 
Non-Governmental 
Higher Education 2,430 22.2 
Other Non-Governmental 1,177 10.8 
Public Health 695 6.4 
Workforce 610 5.6 
Social Service 583 5.3 
Education 480 4.4 
Criminal Justice 471 4.3 
Business 413 3.8 
Total 10,924 100.0 
Note: Excludes the 827 individuals who testified, but did not represent an organized group. Other Non-
Governmental category includes: foundations, labor unions, religious organizations, multi-issue 
organizations (e.g.: National Governors Association and Brookings Institution), and youth organizations. 
Organizations that solely are identified as youth organizations, meaning they do not specialize in one of the 
five sub-issues, are included in this category due to its small sample size. 
 
Table 4.7 presents the frequency of each type of witness and Graph 4.2 then illustrates 
the number of non-governmental witnesses by type during each congressional session. As the 
graph and table show, higher education representatives represented 22 percent of the overall 
witnesses. This category includes a mixture of higher education interest groups, college 
administrators, and professors who testified based on their subject area expertise. Since codes 
were applied to the institution testifying, professors who testified based on their expertise fell 
into the higher education category rather than the subject of their testimony. For instance, if a 
professor from Columbia University was testifying based on his expertise on welfare reform, his 
organization was coded as higher education rather than as social service. 
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The data also suggest that business involvement is uneven across the 35 years, punctuated 
by periods of growth and decline. For instance, from the 95
th
 Congress (1977-1978) to the 99
th
 
Congress (1985-1986) business involvement generally increased. It then declines until the 101
st
 
Congress (1987-1988) and rises again through the early 1990s. Scholars and citizens alike realize 
that business plays a major role in all aspects of the policy process. It is documented that 
business is not only excellent at helping to shape policies that they find helpful to their needs, 
especially with concern to the tax code, but they are also in a unique position given their 
privileged communication with government officials that often advances the needs of business 
over the needs of other interest groups (Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993). Furthermore, scholars 
suggest that business influence on policy is distinct since government relies on private enterprise 
to power the national economy. Although Vogel (1987) argues that while government must rely 
on business, business is also dependent on governmental decisions creating a more equal 
relationship.  
The rate of business involvement in youth issues may be related to the prosperity of the 
American economy. When the labor market and the economy are booming, business leaders may 
be less concerned with youth policy issues because they lack the economic imperative to use 
their political power for youth issues. Conversely, when business conceives of a clear association 
between youth issues and their own prosperity they may be more inclined to utilize their political 
resources. Although their involvement is not consistent, one youth policy advocate interviewed 
suggested that business participation is very important to advancing youth issues on the agenda: 
“Business plays a role in getting attention. A lot of time there is a big spotlight on youth issues 
when corporate leaders speak up on youth issues, for instance the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
on education issues, [although], the [U.S.] Chamber [of Commerce] tends to have an academics 
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only approach to youth issues.” This quote implies that the business community may share 
“policy core” beliefs, in the words of the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), but not “deep 
core” beliefs since they conceive of education as reading, writing, and arithmetic rather than a 
holistic approach to education and child development. Given the importance of the business 
lobby in Washington politics this may explain why the youth agenda on Capitol Hill has been 
inconsistent over the years. 
As discussed in the earlier section, the data on the hearings showed that after the 
Republican takeover of Congress in 1994, there was a general decline in the number of hearings 
focused on social service, workforce development, and public health issues and an increase in the 
number of criminal justice hearings during this same period. As a result, the type of witnesses 
testifying at congressional hearings also shifted. From 1994 through 2008 there was a general 
decrease in witnesses representing social service and workforce development organizations. The 
total number of non-governmental witnesses, however, also declined beginning in the 105
th
 
Congress from 1997-1998.  
Generally speaking an increase in the number of witnesses corresponds with an increase 
in the number of hearings. The only notable exception here is in 1999-2000 when there was an 
increase in the number of hearings but not in the number of witnesses. Beginning in 1995-1996, 
there is a large decline in the overall number of witnesses testifying in youth related 
congressional hearings. In fact, in 2001-2002 there were only 157 witnesses listed, which was 
also the session with the smallest total number of hearing in the database. This may be the result 
of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City. In fact, according to the Policy 
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Agendas Project the number of national security hearings increased considerably to the detriment 
of domestic social policy topics
20
.
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Graph 4.2: Non-Governmental Witnesses by Type, 1973-2008 (n = 6,859) 
Other Business Higher Education 
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4.3: External events hypothesis 
The external events hypothesis presented in Chapter 1 argues that the change in 
congressional attention to youth issues was the result of policy entrepreneurs reacting to 
institutional events allowing for issues to “burst” on the agenda—in other words how certain 
issues appear suddenly and without warning on the agenda. Institutional events and policy 
entrepreneurs can be internal or external to Congress. As discussed in Chapter 1, a policy 
entrepreneur can be thought of as a “champion” of an issue or the primary driver of an initiative. 
The data show these external events were often the establishments of specific institutional 
venues or groups rather than a single event such as the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. 
The follow section reviews the relationship between institutional factors and the change 
over time in youth hearings and presents evidence that supports this hypothesis. This section also 
argues that not all institutional events are associated with increased congressional attention to 
youth issues. The remainder of this section is organized by institutional event. 
4.3A: Vice President Walter Mondale’s Task Force on Youth Employment, 1979  
The early 1980s saw a rise in the number of workforce development hearings, with 
almost half (n = 22) of the total hearings (n = 48) held in the 97
th
 Congress (1981-1982) dealing 
with workforce issues (see Table 4.1). This may be the result of Vice President Walter 
Mondale’s Task Force on Youth Employment, a nine month study beginning in 1979, charged to 
“study the causes of youth unemployment and…the roles of government, education, and 
community organizations in meeting this challenge” (American Enterprise Institute, 1980, p. 2). 
The three volume report of the Task Force, first released in May 1980 explains:  
In order to address this challenge of youth unemployment, President Carter directed a 
full-scale review of Federal youth programs under the leadership of Vice President 
Walter F. Mondale. The aim was to develop youth policies for the 1980’s which make the 
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best use of scarce resources and institutional capacities in meeting this challenge. (The 
Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment, 1980, p. i) 
 
It is not surprising that President Carter asked Vice President Mondale to take on this 
issue since interviewees suggested he was a champion of youth issues when he served as a 
Senator from Minnesota from 1964-1976. This attention to youth employment occurred during a 
period of “soaring inflation and interest rates, rising unemployment, and increasing public 
concern about energy prices, economic stability, and pressing foreign policy difficulties” 
(American Enterprise Institute, 1980, p. 2). These economic difficulties were exaggerated for 
youth of color who were concentrated in urban areas, spurring federal attention. The increase in 
the number of workforce hearings during this period corresponds to the reauthorization of the 
Vocational Education Act, which in turn was a response to these external economic conditions. 
Nevertheless youth workforce development hearings were never as prevalent on the 
congressional agenda after this period. 
During this period, Rep. Carl Perkins (D-Kentucky, 7
th
 district), Chairman of the House 
Education and Labor Committee from 1967–1984, played a particularly active role and can be 
considered a policy entrepreneur who was reacting to the economic conditions of the time. 
Perkins was the first chairman to open committee meetings to the public, which allegedly was a 
successful tactic for ensuring enough members attended hearings and were on their “best 
behavior” (Reeves, 1993).  
Carl D. Perkins, an active and permissive chairman, contributed substantially to the 
growth in hearings. In addition to scheduling regular hearings in Washington, the 
chairman frequently held hearings in his own and other members’ districts. He also 




Furthermore, Rep. Perkins was considered such a champion of youth workforce development 
issues that the 1963 Vocational Education Act was renamed in 1984 the Carl D. Perkins 
Vocational and Technical Education Act. 
4.3B: The creation of the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, 1983 
In 1983, the U.S. House of Representatives created the Select Committee on Children, 
Youth, and Families, conceived of and chaired by Rep. George Miller (D-California, 7
th
 district). 
The creation of this committee was an important institutional change, albeit temporarily, in the 
way Congress handled youth issues. In his opening remarks, Rep. Miller explained the reasoning 
behind the creation of the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families: 
First, we are impressed with the dramatic and permanent changes in the living situations 
of families and children: More children born into poverty, more raised in single-parent 
families, more destined to grow up in, and be shaped by environments vastly different 
than our own. Second, we are deeply concerned about what we see out there—the 
increased stress, the family violence, the abuse, the unacceptably high levels of infant 
mortality. Third, a committee like this can go after the best possible advice. I believe 
there is value in new knowledge itself and we must keep up with it. At times elected 
officials must step outside the pressures of our agenda and our ideologies to use Congress 
to gather information and test ideas without necessarily having a preconceived legislative 
purpose. Fourth, we know from experience that we have the potential for success. From 
WIC to foster care, to name a few, we know success can be reached by a Congress 
willing to combine pragmatism with compassion, workability with equity. (Miller, 1983, 
pp. 1-2) 
 
The creation of the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, spearheaded by 
Rep. Miller, provided an important institutional venue for members to learn about youth issues 
that were previously dealt with by various other entities. Zigler and Muenchow (1984) wrote, 
“The creation of the Select Committee has made it possible to call together some of the most 
talented and experienced people concerned with children's issues. The witnesses come from all 
sectors—representatives from corporations, churches, service organizations, and nonprofit 
agencies, as well as social scientists and leaders” (p. 417). However, as mentioned in the 
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previous chapter, Select Committees are not authorized to draft and report legislation to their 
chamber; rather, they are often formed to: highlight important policy issues, to study or 
investigate pressing problems, to coordinate the development of policy that overlaps the 
jurisdictions of several standing committees, and/or sometimes as a reward from party leaders to 
members who have done them favors (Deering & Smith, 1997).  
Representative Miller’s role in creating the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and 
Families illustrates the importance of a policy entrepreneur. According to one of the policy elites 
interviewed who was a former congressional staffer; Rep. Miller had been in office for six years 
and was not senior enough to take over a subcommittee in the Education and Labor Committee. 
Nonetheless he had a great interest in youth issues, which spurred the creation of the committee. 
The former staffer commented: “He wanted to look across committees to look at programs 
regardless of agency or regardless of congressional committee.” Rep. Miller was also able to 
push for the creation of the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families given the 
longstanding Democratic control of the House of Representatives, which generally supported the 
investigation of domestic social policy issues. Furthermore, the committee brought publicity to 
youth issues, commissioned studies, and made recommendations to standing committees to take 
action. As a result, Rep. Miller’s role as a policy entrepreneur is further evidence of the 
application of multiple streams theory (Kingdon, 2003) that asserts that policy entrepreneurs are 
able to capitalize on their policy window to push their policy preference forward, thereby 
supporting the external events hypothesis. 
The Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families held 40 hearings from 1983 to 
1992 on a variety of youth issues. The Committee took a special interest in public health issues, 
including holding a number of hearings on the effects of HIV and AIDS, eating disorders, 
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adolescent mental health, and adolescent risk-taking. Consequently, the Select Committee, 
chaired by Rep. Miller, was able to help reframe the problem definition of youth issues. In 
addition, when the committee was first formed it also held field hearings throughout the United 
States to examine the holistic “problems and needs of children, youth, and families” in specific 
geographic areas (i.e.: Northeast, Midwest, Southeast, Mountain West, and Southwest). 
According to the elite interviews with those working in Congress during this period, these field 
visits occurred under the special direction of Rep. Miller who wanted to hold hearings outside of 
Washington, D.C. These hearings were unique (at that time and subsequently) because they 
focused on the broad issues affecting youth and families and not on discrete topics, such as only 
focusing on education or criminal justice.  
Unfortunately from the standpoint of youth advocacy, the Select Committee on Children, 
Youth, and Families was disbanded in 1993, along with the Select Committee on Narcotics 
Abuse and Control, the Select Committee on Hunger, and the Select Committee on Aging. In a 
scathing editorial, the Wall Street Journal wrote: “They [Select Committees] have become mini-
fiefdoms for grandstanders such as Rep. Pat Schroeder of Colorado, who chairs Children, Youth 
and Families. They've spent millions, employ more than 90 staffers and do little but get in the 
way of other committees” (Wall Street Journal, 1993). Although the select committees did not 
have a formal role in adopting legislation, they were able to hold hearings that generated 
information and make recommendations. As such, critics claimed that the select committees 
were “intended to be temporary [and] interfere with standing committees covering similar issues, 
and are a waste of staff and money” (Cohen, 1993). Furthermore, Tony Blankley, the press 
secretary to Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia), the House minority whip at that time, was quoted 
84 
 
in Education Week as saying that the select committees have been "flagrantly used as an 
opportunity to do press releases'' promoting their leaders (Cohen, 1993).  
The demise of the select committees was foreshadowed in January 1993 when Democrats 
joined House Republicans in defeating, 237 to 180, a measure brought up separately to 
reauthorize the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control for two years. According to 
the Washington Post “Democratic leaders, surprised at the losing vote, ultimately decided that 
junking the select committees could serve as a symbol of congressional reform. The panels spent 
about $ 3.7 million a year, and their closing will save about $ 2.7 million for the remainder of the 
current budget year” (Cooper, 1993). At the announcement of the closing of the Select 
Committee on Children, Youth, and Families Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colorado), head of the 
Committee and the only woman serving as chairwoman of a congressional committee at that 
time, called for a new and permanent Human Resources Committee. She was quoted as saying: 
"Of course, natural resources have theirs, but human resources don't…I guess we care more 
about owls than kids" (Cooper, 1993). Her call to action, however, was never realized and no 
committee to date has fully taken over the jurisdiction of the Select Committee on Children, 
Youth, and Families.  
4.3C: Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 1992 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965 (P.L. 89-329) is the 
major law addressing postsecondary in the nation. It established: financial aid in the form of 
scholarships and low-interest loans for students, the Talent Search program to identify older, 
low-income youth with potential for postsecondary education, student support services to 
improve disadvantaged college students’ retention and graduation rates, and Upward Bound that 
provides high school students from low-income families academic and social support to increase 
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high school graduation and college access. The data suggest that whenever the Higher Education 
Act was reauthorized in 1976, 1980, 1986, 1992, 1998, and 2008,
21
 it corresponds to a spike in 
the number of education hearings. In fact, the largest surge in the number of youth hearings 
occurred in the 102
nd
 Congress (1991-1992), primarily driven by an increase in education 
hearings due to the reauthorization of the HEA. Of the 97 youth hearings held in the 102
nd
 
Congress, half (n = 48) were dedicated to education. Unlike the other policy areas, higher 
education represents a self-contained industry of diverse actors (e.g. private sector institutions, 
public sector institutions, for-profit institutions, students, parents. and so forth) and therefore is 
effective at mobilizing its various constituencies when needed (Weisbrod, Ballou, & Asch, 
2008). Consequently, the regular reauthorizations of the Higher Education Act catalyzed 
increases in attention to youth issues. 
Furthermore, Rep. William D. Ford (D-Michigan) chair of the House Education and 
Labor Committee from 1991 through 1994 and was previously chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Higher Education and Workforce Training, was a big proponent of holding congressional 
hearings and “liked to get into issues in great depth,” according to a former staffer. It was during 
his chairmanship that higher education hearings peaked as he reacted to the reauthorizations of 
the HEA with the convening of congressional hearings. Moreover, under Rep. Ford’s leadership 
there was also an increase in the number of hearings on criminal justice, social service and public 
health topics, although not to the same extent as the increase in education hearings.  
4.3D: White House Task Force for Disadvantaged Youth, 2005 
President George W. Bush’s 2003 convening of the White House Task Force for 
Disadvantaged Youth was a major turning point in youth policy since it assessed federal youth 
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 There is no spike in education hearings in 2008 most likely due to a lack of up-to-date data provided by ProQuest. 
See section on data limitations in Chapter 3.  
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policy and developed recommendations to strengthen the federal response to the needs of youth. 
However, this event is minimally represented in the data. There is only one congressional 
hearing regarding the Task Force in 2005. Although, evidence in support of Hypothesis I 
requires an event to concur with an increase in congressional hearings, the Task Force is still 
worth mentioning as it was a turning point in federal attention to youth policy since it includes a 
policy entrepreneur, Rep Tom Osborne (R-Nebraska, 3
rd
 district), working to advance youth 




The Task Force found that, “federal youth policy, administered across 12 departments, 
lacks coordination and focus” (Executive Office of the President, October 2003). Acting on the 
findings of the Task Force, The Federal Youth Coordination Act (FYCA) was introduced in the 
109
th
 Congress to implement the report’s recommendations. The original legislation, H.R. 856, 
passed the House in November 2005 by an overwhelming bipartisan vote of 353 to 62, with 163 
Republicans supporting it, and no Democrats opposing. The bill was introduced by 
Representatives Tom Osborne (R-Nebraska, 3
rd
 district), Harold Ford Jr. (D-Tennessee, 9
th
 
district), Pete Hoekstra (R-Michigan, 2
nd
 district) and Donald Payne (D-New Jersey, 10
th
 
district). The companion bill in the Senate, S. 409, was introduced by Senators Norm Coleman 
(R-Minnesota), Mike DeWine (R-Ohio), Lamar Alexander (R-Tennessee) and Debbie Stabenow 
(D-Michigan). After much negotiation, FYCA was modified slightly, renamed for Tom Osborne, 
its congressional champion, and attached as Title VIII of the Older Americans Act 
                                                     
22
 For example, in 2001 a group of foundations formed the Youth Transition Funders Group dedicated to improving 
the lives of disconnected youth. Furthermore, many scholars have produced studies calculating the estimated socio-
economic effects of dropping out during this period (e.g., Adair, 2001; Harlow, 2003; Thorstensen, 2005, Alliance 
for Excellent Education, 2003, & Rouse, 2005). 
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reauthorization bill. It passed the House and the Senate with no opposition at the end of 
September, 2006. It was signed into law by the president on October 17, 2006. 
The Tom Osborne Federal Youth Coordination Act (PL 109-365) established the Federal 
Youth Development Council. According to sec. 803 of the law ("Older Americans Act 
Amendments of 2006), the Council was to be made up of 11 federal department secretaries and 
heads of agencies, representatives from youth-serving nonprofits, foundations and faith-based 
organizations, and young people themselves. The Congress authorized $1 million for the 
Council, but due to the continuing resolution for FY 2007, which did not include new programs, 
the Federal Youth Development Council did not receive funding for FY 2007, and was not 
included in the FY 2008 budget request. In sum, although the federal government devoted 
attention to the issue of disconnected youth, they did not and still have not followed through with 
implementation. 
The remaining institutional events explained in sections 4.3E and 4.3F did not result in 
more congressional attention to youth issues as reflected in the empirical data. Furthermore, the 
interviews did not reveal any particular policy entrepreneurs in the youth policy community or in 
Congress that were responsible for championing these issues on Capitol Hill.  
4.3E: A Nation at Risk, 1983 
Although the data suggest that some spikes in the number of hearings correspond to 
external events, there are other external events that do not correspond with an increase in 
hearings. In 1983 The National Commission on Excellence in Education published A Nation at 
Risk; the most influential and widely cited report on American education. The report argued that 
“the rising tide of mediocrity” in American education was a direct threat to the nation’s 
economic dominance and power. It contended that the change to a global knowledge economy 
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coupled with a decrease in educational attainment in the United States was a looming national 
crisis. The Commission asserted that although the quantity of U.S. high school graduates had 
increased over-time, the quality of the education had decreased. They argued that this was 
especially concerning due to the rise of international competition. The authors argued that 
previously the United States had secured its economic dominance through its manufacturing 
sectors, but with globalization and outsourcing, that was no longer the case.  
The Commission based its findings on commissioned papers from the scholarly 
community, hearings from those involved in the education and business sector, and searches for 
examples of notable programs and promising approaches to specific problems in American 
education. Additionally, the Commission examined course taking patterns of high school 
students in 1964-1969 compared with course taking patterns of high school students in 1976-
1981. Even though the Commission did not empirically test its conclusions, its findings had a 
major impact on education policy and to some extent still do. There are no hearings in the 
database, however, that specifically mention A Nation at Risk. Given the report’s influence 
though it may have spurred the general increase in education hearings beginning in the early 
1980s (illustrated in Graph 4.1), but the congressional hearings collected in this study do not 
specifically mention the report as a causal factor.  
4.3F: The Forgotten Half and Turning Points, 1988-1989 
Furthermore, the literature suggests that the publication of two seminal reports produced 
by the philanthropic community that framed the challenges of youth policy, were important in 
moving the youth agenda forward (Pittman, Irby, & Ferber, 2000; Scott, et al., 2006); however, 
this is not reflected in the data. The William T. Grant Foundation’s Commission on Work, 
Family, and Citizenship issued the influential report The Forgotten Half, which drew attention to 
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the vulnerable population of non-college-bound young people and the lack of adequate social, 
economic, and vocational supports for those not in trouble, but not in college (The William T. 
Grant Foundation Commission on Work Family and Citizenship, 1988). In addition, The 
Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development published Turning Points, which identified the 
systems that serve young people (e.g.: schools, health care institutions, and community based 
organizations) (Task Force on Education of Young Adolescents, 1989). Both of these reports 
“captured public opinion and set the stage for a decade of work focused on building on youth 
potential” (Pittman, et al., 2000, p. 19). Although these received attention in the field, one elite 
respondent suggested that in general Congress is unresponsive to foundations unless they thought 
“they did something egregious” such as the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 in response 
to the close relationship between the Ford Foundation’s and Sen. Robert F. Kennedy’s (D-New 
York) staff in the 1960s. 
4.3G: External events hypothesis conclusion 
 The data suggest that in many cases the external events hypothesis accurately captures 
the formation of youth policy on the congressional agenda. Several examples show the 
importance of policy entrepreneurs exploiting environment factors to increase the status of youth 
issues. It is possible, however, that the data are missing the role that other actors could have 
played to assist policy entrepreneurs in this situation. Although the roles of other potential actors 
were not identified in the elite interviews, the study is limited by the small number of 
respondents included in the analysis.  
4.4: Internal actors hypothesis 
The internal actors hypothesis asserts that interest groups representing the various sub-
issues of youth policy decided to strategically work together, through testifying at the same 
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hearings, to publicize the importance of youth issues. To examine the degree to which different 
types of organizations testified together at the same hearing, a measure consistent with 
collaboration, I calculated and graphed the Index of Overlap derived from the Herfindahl index. 
The Index of Overlap summarizes the degree to which types of organizations appeared 
independently or part of a larger group of organizations as witnesses in each committee included 
in the sample. A high score indicates that the organizational type dominated a committee, 
meaning that other types of groups did not have a significant presence in that committee. 
Conversely, a low score suggests that the organizational type testified at committee hearings 
along with other types of groups illustrating that the committee heard testimony from diverse 
organizational groups rather than from one single type. This measure, however, is unable to 
distinguish if diverse issues groups were working in collaboration, only that they were present at 
committee hearings over a congressional session. Each type of witness received a score between 
zero and 100 for each congressional session to represent the degree to which that type of non-
governmental witness is concentrated in a given committee for each two-year period.  
4.4A: Coalition activity 
The findings presented in Table 4.8 and Graph 4.4 show that the majority of groups 
received a score below 50
23
 on the Index of Overlap indicating the diffuseness of the groups 
operating across the committees. In addition, I examined the data by quartile to see if that altered 
the main findings which found that the majority of organizations received scores in the second 
quartile from 26 to 51. Only public health interest groups and “other” institutions had an average 
score under 25, therefore suggesting that those types of organizations were most likely to be 
                                                     
23
 Given that the scale is from 0 to 100, I examine the data two ways. First, I selected 50 as the arbitrator of high or 
low levels of concentration since there is no information in the literature to suggest the implication of certain scores 
of an Index of Overlap and corresponding concentration. Second, I examined the Index by quartile, 0-25, 26-50, 51-
75, 76-100, to see if there was any variation among the concentration of groups by quartile. 
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present at congressional hearings with other types of groups when the data is aggregated to the 
committee level. Conversely, education and workforce development organizations were the most 
concentrated on the Index of Overlap meaning that they were most likely to be present at 
congressional hearings that only included other education witnesses and not at hearings with a 
variety of issue groups present. 
An examination of the scores on the Index of Overlap over time reveals several 
congressional sessions where all organizations received a score below 50. For instance from 
1987-1996 and again from 1999-2008, each organization received a low score. This may suggest 
that over time, youth interest groups have been more strategic in their activities on Capitol Hill. 
For instance, in 2001, a handful of youth interest groups organized The Campaign for Youth, to 
build consensus among organizations that focus on improving the chances for disconnected 
youth. A leader in that organization, who was interviewed for the study, suggested that basic 
premise of the Campaign for Youth is to bring together the various organizations working on 
behalf of young people that have no political voice to bring those issues to the forefront. To that 
end, they have sought out input from 1,000 organizations around the country that work with 
disconnected youth in an attempt to raise the awareness of youth issues during presidential 
elections, with varied success. During the 2004 election, the Campaign convened an event with 
the campaign chairs for President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry and young people to 
interact and voice their questions. Although they made a similar attempt during the 2008 
election, they were “unable to gain interest from the campaigns in the way we were during the 
prior campaign.” 
In general, the data suggest that diverse youth advocacy groups testified at the same 
hearings— a measure consistent with a coalitional strategy—to possibly work to advance the 
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youth agenda in Congress. During this period, it is possible that interest groups realized that the 
advancement of the youth policy agenda in Congress required a broad coalition able to work 
across committee jurisdiction. In other words, the Index of Overlap results suggest that diverse 
groups were by and large testifying at the same hearings, which is consistent with a theory that 
these groups were working together in Congress, during the 35 years identified in this study. The 
data, however, can only identify that diverse actors were present at the hearing and not that were 
in fact working collaboratively. 
However, the data presented in Graph 4.3 does show a handful of spikes where the Index 
of Overlap is above 50 (indicating a concentration of groups in committees), but only two spikes 
involve more than one type of group concentrated during the same congressional session. The 
spikes of an individual group concentrated in a single committee tend to correspond with the 
reauthorization of a major piece of legislation related to the type of group. For instance, the spike 
in criminal justice groups in 1975-1976 corresponded to the reauthorization of the Juvenile 
Justice Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. Higher Education Act reauthorizations in 1985-86 
and 1997-1998 also caused similar spikes in education and higher education groups. 
Consequently, types of organizations cluster in certain committees when legislation that directly 
affects their constituents is up for reauthorization. When this is not the case, non-governmental 
organizations concerned with youth issues tend to spread out across committees as shown by the 
Index of Overlap, which is consistent with a more collaborative strategy.  
It was only in the 97
th
 Congress (1981-1982) that business, education, and workforce 
groups each received a score over 50. During this period, all of these groups are concentrated in 
the House Education and Labor Committee regarding Perkins re-authorization. Since these three 
groups dominated the committee, it may suggest that education, workforce development, and 
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business organizations coordinated their efforts, which is consistent with a coalitional strategy. 
The date cannot determine, however, if these groups were testifying in support or against of each 
other. It also cannot distinguish if these groups were selected by the committee chairman to 
testify together of if they strategically choose to testify together in front of the committee.  In 
addition, education and higher education groups also each received a score above 50 in the 98
th
 
Congress (1983-1984). Since these groups are closely related and represent educational 
opportunity from childhood through adulthood, what is now often referred to as the P16 pipeline 
of pre-Kindergarten through a BA or 16
th
 grade, however, it is not surprising that the efforts of 
education and higher education organizations overlapped in the same committees.  
Although the data can only suggest collaboration, several of the interview respondents 
did speak about the coalition strategy attempted by many of the youth policy advocacy 
organizations. One policy director for a youth organization explained: “Everyone’s policy shops 
are so small and we always try and build a coalition of organizations to work together.” He 
described how the youth field has many small advocacy organizations, but that none of them is 
large enough to independently influence policy. According to the respondent, the average 
environmental advocacy organization has 300,000 people on their mailing list and most youth 
policy groups only have an average of 5,000 people on their lists. He commented that, “until 
those numbers flip we cannot change policy to the same extent. Young people aren’t as 
compelling an issue to rally around compared to the environment.” 
Interviewees also suggested that they mainly target the two main education committees in 
Congress, but based on the particular issue, they also seek out opportunities to testify at other 
committees. Organizations focused on national service and service learning, which I place under 
workforce development, commented that they also targeted transportation and natural resources 
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committees since those committees were often responsive to having young people involved in 
environmental projects that they authorized. Respondents from various organizations also spoke 
about supporting each other’s activity on Capitol Hill and testifying on myriad issues, not always 
directly related to their main organizational mission. For example, a representative of a 
workforce development organization commented that she testified several times to the judiciary 
committee in terms of her organization’s support of programs for youth involved in the justice 
system. Consequently, the elite interviews support the notion of collaboration as also suggested 
by the Herfindahl Index analysis. 
4.4B: Internal actors hypothesis conclusion 
The Herfindahl Index of Overlap identifies the level of concentration types of witness 
had by congressional committee. When there is a high concentration of a group in a committee it 
suggests that different types of groups are not present in the committee, which may suggest that 
other youth interest groups are not targeting that committee. On the other hand, it could indicate 
that collaboration may exist, but that the coalition decided to let one type of interest group focus 
on a particular committee. When there is a low concentration of many groups in a committee it 
may be an indication that different types of interest groups may be working in a coalition. This 
method, however, is unable to determine how and why distinct issues groups may be working 
together. It is also unable to analyze if groups found at the same committee are working in 
collaboration or are in competition with each other. It is possible that diverse interest groups 
found in the same committee could be an indication of competition and not collaboration. Rather, 
the Index of Overlap captures the presence of different groups testifying together by committee. 
The findings, however, are supported by the elite interviews which corroborated the hypothesis 
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of collaboration. Nonetheless, additional qualitative research would be needed to further unpack 





























Graph 4.3: Witness Index of Overlap from 1973-2008 (n = 6,859) 
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Local Gov. 29 55 29 38 57 30 29 12 24 21 27 28 40 37 28 16 54 21 32 
State Gov. 29 33 28 30 39 29 30 13 24 24 20 23 28 20 28 34 14 13 25 
Fed. Gov. 36 35 24 28 21 25 19 16 15 18 27 32 21 19 14 16 14 13 22 
Congress 31 43 37 33 23 54 27 28 22 25 47 60 41 18 21 21 22 27 32 
Indian Gov. 100  51  100 100 53 83 91 100 100 50  78 100  63 38 79 
Court 31 59 56 50 33 33 100 32 21 33 31 34 35 22 39 50 25 100 44 
K12 35 100 38 63 72 60 64 39 65 47 27 38 78 41 50 50 50 50 54 








































Pub. Health 24 25 40 18 33 31 17 18 24 15 22 30 21 17 26 18 15 20 23 
Soc. 
Service 
26 37 25 27 23 42 21 17 25 22 49 32 31 39 44 31 33 23 30 
Workforce 35 39 44 45 78 39 48 26 32 47 35 36 49 72 50 28 28 30 42 
Crim. Just. 20 68 25 32 24 21 18 28 16 42 41 34 19 21 31 16 42 32 29 
Education 29 50 68 32 76 52 55 28 36 31 38 35 40 43 50 38 25 41 42 
Higher Ed. 34 40 18 47 41 61 46 26 18 42 24 28 52 19 37 41 19 16 34 
Business 33 38 38 46 100 30 34 24 35 32 22 37 37 23 32 24 26 22 35 
Other 29 24 16 34 26 24 15 15 19 18 23 31 26 26 13 25 17 15 22 







In this chapter I have presented the empirical evidence documenting congressional 
attention to youth issues in an introductory attempt to systematically and empirically study 
federal attention to youth issues from 1973 to 2008. The findings indicate that congressional 
attention to youth policy issues cannot be easily summarized. Congress has oscillated between 
devoting time and energy to the issues impacting young people, to a general hands-off attitude 
leaving much out of the political discourse. In some cases the external events hypothesis is 
validated, but not always. For instance, there was very little congressional activity related to 
youth after A Nation at Risk and in response to the 2003 White House Task Force on 
Disconnected Youth. In addition, the empirical evidence demonstrates that the documented 
interest group behavior is consistent with collaboration, the evidenced does not always support a 
relationship between group concentration in committees and a change in the number of youth 
related hearings held in Washington. A further analysis of how the findings relate to the two 
hypotheses and further implications and policy recommendations will be discussed in the final 







Chapter 5: Implications and conclusion 
Traditionally youth policy has been studied from a psycho-social perspective that treats 
the concept of youth as a natural developmental stage or as a reaction to external factors. This 
dissertation, however, examined these issues from a political perspective and analyzed how 
political actors and public policy play a role in shaping the social construction of youth. In 
essence, political actors and policymakers make choices regarding the content and 
implementation of policy when they are confronted with an issue or problem. The choice of 
design elements in a given public policy, therefore, “reflects political and social values, historical 
precedent, national trends in ideas about ‘good’ policy, as well as a host of ‘local’ knowledge 
that leads to enormous variability in policy designs across time and space” (Schneider & Sidney, 
2009, p. 105). Consequently, youth issues and youth policy cannot be fully understood without 
analyzing the political components of the policymaking process. 
The concepts of “social construction” and “target populations” play an important role in 
the policymaking process. Social construction is defined as “the underlying understanding of the 
social world that places meaning-making at the center” and target populations refer to the 
different types of people or groups that policy is attempting to change (Schneider & Sidney, 
2009). Social construction distinguishes socially meaningful target populations through the 
attribution of values, symbols, and images. Consequently, through imposed eligibility criteria 
target populations become empirically verifiable and take on group identities (Schneider & 
Ingram, 1993).  
Once target groups are created and assume an identity, Schneider and Ingram (1993) 
argue that they can be characterized as belonging to one of four major types of broad policy 
targets: advantaged (powerful groups with positive images), contenders (powerful groups with 







groups with negative images). In terms of this typology, youth are often classified as “deviants” 
since they lack both social inclusion and political power. Young people are often characterized 
as a negative target population, rather than by the positive attributes they possess. 
In breaking with the traditional body of research on youth policy, this dissertation, 
analyzed how political actors and the policy process play a role in shaping the social construction 
of young people and youth policy. In particular, this research examined the role of Congress in 
creating the youth policy agenda. Congress was chosen as the venue to study the youth policy 
agenda because public policymaking occurs most frequently, although not absolutely, on the 
federal level through the work of Congress (Weir, et al., 1988). Consequently the issues that 
Congress selects to study and analyze are those which become significant politically. 
On the most basic level, in a functioning representative democracy, the subjects to which 
the legislative branch devotes agenda space, are ideally the topics that concern most Americans. 
In reality, however, not all issues that are important to citizens receive space on the 
congressional agenda, as there are simply more issues than there is agenda space. As a result, 
issues are constantly in competition with each other for political attention and this conflict 
produces winners and losers (Downs, 1972; Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). The individuals who 
control congressional committees, furthermore, have considerable power in determining which 
issues receive attention in Congress and which witnesses are called upon to inform the 
committee (DeGregorio, 1992; Leyden, 1995; Talbert, et al., 1995). In the modern political 
system, issues rise and fall on the political agenda in large part as a function of the lobbying 







5.1: The study 
This dissertation was an initial study of federal youth policy from 1973 to 2008. For the 
purpose of this research, youth policy was represented by five main sub-issues: criminal justice, 
education, public health, social service, and workforce development. To date, no research exists 
on the creation or evolution of youth policy on the federal level. The limited empirical research 
on the politics of youth policy is comprised of a few publications from the same study on the 
politics of youth advocacy in the San Francisco, California Bay Area (Deschenes, McLaughlin, 
& Newman, 2008; McLaughlin, Scott, Deschenes, Hopkins, & Newman, 2009; Scott, et al., 
2006). More research was, and still is, needed on this topic; therefore, this dissertation begins to 
fill the research gap.  
Furthermore, this dissertation broadened the small body of research on youth policy by 
examining the politics on the federal level. Historically social and youth policy, targeted to the 
urban poor, were most often considered local-level issues. Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, 
however, Congress expanded its jurisdiction and actively mandated large-scale social policy 
programs targeted to the urban poor and youth. As explained in Chapter 2, beginning in the 
1960s the federal government expanded its reach into these issues and developed legislation 
authorizing the creation of and appropriations for youth-targeted programs. As a result this 
dissertation not only examined an issue currently underrepresented in the academic literature, but 
it also expanded the conceptualization of youth issues to include a study of the politics of youth 
policy in Congress. 
This study, therefore, examined longitudinally the presence of youth policy issues on the 
congressional agenda and tested competing theories that explained the historical pattern derived 







The database I constructed included 107 laws, 986 hearings, 3,389 separate testimonies, and 
11,751 witnesses. In addition, I conducted a small number of interviews (n = 5) with members of 
the youth advocacy coalition to contextualize the results of the congressional hearings analysis. 
Congressional hearings were chosen as the main source of data because they are the venue in 
which “lobbyists have their greatest influence” and present a snapshot of the important issues of 
the time.  
This dissertation put forth two possible hypotheses to explain the presence of youth 
issues in Congress over time. The external events hypothesis argued that changing environmental 
conditions were the catalytic element enabling more youth issues to receive congressional 
attention, with policy entrepreneurs reacting to these changes. The second theory, the internal 
actors hypothesis, asserted that internal political actors, such as congressional leaders and interest 
groups were the primary actors responsible for facilitating the presence of youth issues on the 
congressional agenda. In essence, congressional leaders and youth interest groups acted as policy 
entrepreneurs and redefined the social construction of youth and shopped around to find the most 
advantageous venue to advance their issue. This hypothesis places less emphasis on the changing 
environmental conditions; rather, it asserts that it was the internal actors themselves that 
strategically pushed for more attention to youth issues. .  
5.2: Findings 
The findings, presented in the previous chapter, suggested the youth issues were more or 
less prevalent on the congressional agenda over these 35 years both as a reaction to policy to 
external broader institutional issues, and from the proactive process of interest groups working 
together to publicize the importance of youth policy. The peaks in the number of hearings from 







youth hearings, since there were several instances where institutional changes and external 
events helped motivate this increased activity. However this was not consistently the case as 
there were also times when significant and relevant external events did not correspond to an 
increase of congressional hearings. 
Furthermore, the comparison of the total number of hearings held per session to the total 
number of congressional hearings included in the previous chapter showed that at most Congress 
devoted only a small amount of its time to youth issues. Even in years with large numbers of 
youth hearings, youth issues took up at most three percent of the total agenda. In sum, youth 
policy was clearly not considered as a significant public policy issue by the United States 
Congress. 
In addition, the empirical evidence demonstrated that a variety of non-governmental 
interest groups were present at the same committees. This is consistent with the theory that 
interest groups formed a youth advocacy coalition to better achieve their policy agenda, thereby, 
supporting the internal actors hypothesis. It showed that interest groups acted strategically in 
their interactions with Congress to advance their cause and did not confine their activity only to 
reactions to external events. However, it is clear that that the youth lobby had limited success in 
persuading Congress to hold more youth hearings to advance the prominence of youth issues on 
the national policy agenda. 
These findings, therefore, suggest that the process of bringing youth issues to 
congressional attention is complex and messy. By and large the external events hypothesis most 
accurately explains the patterns of congressional attention, but it is not universally applicable. 
Although the evidence suggests that the internal actors hypothesis is also partially accurate, the 







together and an increase in congressional hearings shows that the youth coalition was successful 
in advancing youth policy on Capitol Hill only to a limited degree. 
The analysis of congressional hearings also surfaced important distinctions, documented 
in the literature, between the political party controlling each chamber and the content of hearings 
held (Petrocik, 1996). The analysis suggests that when Republicans controlled the House of 
Representatives they held more hearings on traditional conservative issues and that when 
Democrats controlled the chamber that they held more hearings on traditional liberal issues. 
Education which was historically considered a liberal issue, however, was more prevalent in the 
House of Representative when Republicans controlled the chamber compared to Democrats. This 
illustrates the changing role of education as an important policy issue in national politics. 
5.3: Implications 
Although the empirical evidence suggests that a youth advocacy coalition exists, it is by-
and-large a fragmented and loosely-connected coalition. In fact, every respondent interviewed 
for this study gave a different answer to my asking them to define the terms youth, adolescence, 
and youth development, thus illustrating the lack of unity among youth interest groups. One 
respondent, however, was adamant that the lack of consensus was not an issue. He explained: “It 
hasn’t hindered the movement of youth policy. The United Nations definition is 15 to 24. Let’s 
just leave it there!” The results of this dissertation, however, suggest otherwise. 
Nevertheless, I argue that the lack of a cohesive problem definition and target population 
boundaries hinders the advancement of youth issues on the political agenda. How can youth 
policy win a bigger slice of the agenda pie, if the youth interest groups cannot decide on a 
consensual definition of their target population? For instance, the lack of a clear definition of 







policies define youth for the purposes of service delivery and research (United States 
Government Accountability Office, February 2008; Wald & Martinez, 2003). In this age of 
limited resources that require programs to be accountable for public monies spent, the country 
needs a common definition of what constitutes a youth program and what does not. Otherwise, 
youth programs and policies can never be accurately studied and compared, thereby, hampering 
the evolution of youth issues on the political agenda. 
If the youth lobby wants to achieve more for its constituents, it must formulate a clear 
definition of the actual group of people they are representing. With every interest group using a 
different definition of “youth” it is nearly impossible to enlarge the youth policy coalition and 
market the issue to legislators and the public at-large. If interest groups and constituents are 
going to be more successful in advocating for youth issues, they all need to come together and 
start speaking the same language, in order to spur political action (Edelman, 1994).  
Language, however, is not static, but constantly evolves as issue advocates try to replace 
negative language with positive terminology. The target population that was once referred to as 
“crippled” became “handicapped,” which in turn became “disabled” (Ingram, et al., 2007). 
Although youth interest groups have worked to change the negative image of youth, they have 
not acted collectively and consistently. Unifying their language will also enable interest groups 
to better shape the social construction of youth. As the findings suggest, youth policy is generally 
equated with education policy. If youth policy advocates are to be more successful in placing all 
youth issues on the congressional agenda, they need to have a unified message that uses the same 
language.  
Although youth policy began as a local issue, it is currently estimated that the federal 







departments and agencies (Campaign for a White House Office on Children and Youth, n.d.). 
Even though the youth lobby has not been as successful as their members would like, the federal 
government nonetheless runs many programs targeted to young adults. Table 5.1 lists some of 
the reasons the federal government is involved in youth issues according to the 2003 Task Force 
on Disadvantaged Youth. 
Table 5.1: Why the federal government gets involved in disadvantaged youth issues: 
Reason Explanation Examples 
Seriousness of the 
problem 
To provide federal intervention for large 
growing problems, that in the past have not 
been “properly” addressed  
Programs for job training 
or welfare dependency 
Preferred strategy To incentivize the use of particular strategies 
through allocating funds for that specific 
purpose 
Family planning services, 
abstinence education 
Specific services Congress chooses to allocate funds for specific 
programs or services 
Safe and drug-free 
schools, health care for 
mothers and children 
Greater federal 
resources 
To use federal dollars to supplement state and 
local initiatives 
Title I education funding 
For the common good To use federal dollars for programs to that serve 
broader values and goals of the nation 
Public education 
Legal/constitutional To protect the federal rights of youth and ensure 
equal protection of the law 
Disabilities programs 
Special programs To offer help for a specific target population Special education, 
minority programs 
Technical reasons To use the authority of the federal government 
to address issues across state lines 
Collaborative efforts 
between various levels of 
the government 
National goals To help meet federally-established goals Public health and 
education goals 
Economic reasons To enhance the economic competitiveness of 
the country 
Economic development 
and job creation 
Voluntary service To encourage voluntary, community service in 
local communities 
AmeriCorps, VISTA 
Source: The White House Task Force for Disadvantaged Youth. (2003). Preliminary report on findings for the 
federal response to disadvantaged youth. Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Although the federal government runs many youth programs, this does not mean that they 
implement these programs and policies in any coordinated or systematic fashion. This is evident 







the needs of young people. This research, however, does not seem to be leading to real change. 
Although Congress passed the Federal Youth Coordination Act (FYCA), it only held one hearing 
on the topic. Not surprisingly, the FYCA was never implemented.  
As such, the youth lobby also needs to do more to persuade legislators to read and react 
to the growing body of research and reports on the changing nature of adulthood and how that 
impacts the nation’s young people. Interest groups and researchers are creating these materials 
and espousing high value to their products, yet there is no evidence that Congress is receiving 
this information and/or translating these findings into congressional hearings and public policy 
changes. These research reports usually include compelling evidence as to why elected officials 
should care about young people, but it does no good if legislators do not assimilate or respond to 
these findings. 
Given the importance of political party and the youth issues that receive attention in 
congressional hearings, the youth lobby should target their initiatives based on the political party 
in control. Although they do not want to prioritize one issue to the detriment of the others, it 
would be prudent for youth interest groups to take into account the issues that are traditionally 
important to the party in control of Congress. For example, when Republicans control Congress, 
especially the House of Representatives, it would be strategic to focus on juvenile justice and 
education issues, while when Democrats are in power to focus on public health, social service, 
and workforce development issues.  
5.4: Limitations and future research 
Given the lack of research on the politics of youth policy at the federal level, this study 
represents a first attempt to examine these issues. Future research is needed to explore this topic 







publication of congressional hearings via the ProQuest website, the database used in this study is 
most likely incomplete. This is especially true for the later years included in this study since it is 
highly likely that ProQuest is not yet up-to-date for more recent years. This is evident by the lack 
of total hearings held in the 2007-2008 session irrespective of topic of hearing. In addition, 
future research should include a larger sample of elite interviews. This study was able only to 
include five elite interviews and a larger sample would be helpful to explore these issues in more 
detail.  
As mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, the use of the Herfindahl Index of Overlap to measure 
interest group collaboration is another limitation of the study. This method posits that if different 
types of groups are diffusely represented within committees than the evidence is consistent with 
the notion of collaboration. This method, however, is unable to determine how and why distinct 
issues groups may be working together. It is also unable to analyze if groups found at the same 
committee are working in collaboration or are in competition with each other. It is possible that 
diverse interest groups found in the same committee could be an indication of competition and 
not collaboration. Rather, the Index of Overlap captures the presence of different groups 
testifying together by committee. Although the findings were supported by the elite interviews, 
additional qualitative research should be completed to further analyze how groups came together 
and the commonality of their policy positions. 
Finally, more research is needed to examine the presence of youth issues on the 
congressional agenda and the actual implementation of youth policy. Researchers should 
examine the relationship between congressional attention and congressional appropriations to 
youth issues to more fully understand the federal role in youth policy. This would help elucidate 








Aberbach, J. D., & Rockman, B. A. (2002). Conducting and coding elite interviews. PS: 
Political Science and Politics, 35(4), 673-676.  
Adair, V. C. (2001). Poverty and the (broken) promise of education. Harvard Educational 
Review, 71(2), 217-239. 
Alliance for Excellent Education. (2003). Fact sheet: The impact of education on health and 
well-being. Washington, DC: Author. 
American Enterprise Institute. (1980). Youth employment legislation: The Youth Act of 1980 
Legislative Analysis No. 20, 96th Congress. Washington, DC: Author. 
American Youth Policy Forum. (1999). A youth development approach to services for young 
people: The work of the Family and Youth Services Bureau  Retrieved December 1, 
2011, from http://www.aypf.org/forumbriefs/1999/fb061199.htm 
Anderson, J. E. (2006). Public policymaking (6th ed.). Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company. 
Arnett, J. J. (1998). Learning to stand alone: The contemporary American transition to adulthood 
in cultural and historical context. Human Development, 41(5/6), 295-315.  
Arnett, J. J. (2000). Emerging adulthood: A theory of development from the late teens through 
the twenties. American Psychologist, 55(5), 469-480.  
Arnett, J. J. (2004). Emerging adulthood: The winding road from the late teens through the 
twenties. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. S. (1962). Two faces of power. American Political Science Review, 
56(4), 947-952.  
Bachrach, P., & Baratz, M. S. (1970). Power and poverty. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 
Barton, P. E. (2005). One-third of a nation: Rising dropout rates and declining opportunities. 
Princeton, NJ: Policy Information Center, Educational Testing Service. 
Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. (1993). Agendas and instability in American politics. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Baumgartner, F. R., Jones, B. D., & MacLeod, M.C. (2000). The evolution of legislative 
jurisdictions. The Journal of Politics, 62(2), 321-349.  
Berry, J. M. (1977). Lobbying for the people: The political behavior of public interest groups. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Berry, J. M. (2007). Nonprofit organizations as interest groups: The politics of passivity. In A.J. 
Cigler & B. A. Loomis (Eds.), Interest group politics (7th ed., pp. 235-255). Washington, 
DC: CQ Press. 
Berry, J. M., & Wilcox, C. (2009). The interest group society (5th ed.). New York, NY: Pearson 
Education, Inc. 
Browne, W. P. (1990). Organized interests and their issue niches: A search for pluralism in a 
policy domain. Journal of Politics, 52(2), 447-509.  
Burt, M. R., & Resnick, G. M., N. (1992). Comprehensive service integration programs for at 
risk youth. Final Report Produced for the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services under Contract HHS-100-92-0005. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press. 
Campaign for a White House Office on Children and Youth. (n.d.). White House Office on 
Children and Youth.  Retrieved September 27, 2011, from 
http://www.whitehouseofficeonchildrenandyouth.org/ 
Center for Youth Development and Policy Research. (n.d.). What is youth development? 







Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice. (n.d.). Juvenile justice history  Retrieved February 9, 
2012, from http://www.cjcj.org/juvenile/justice/juvenile/justice/history/0 
Cigler, A. J. (1991). Interest Groups: A Subfield in Search of an Identity. In W. Crotty (Ed.), 
American Institutions Volume 4 (pp. 99-135). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press. 
Cobb, R. W., & Ross, M. H. (Eds.). (1997). Cultural strategies of agenda denial. Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas. 
Cohen, D. L. (1993, February 10). Select panel on children may be facing extinction, Education 
Week.  
Conlan, T. J. (1998). From new federalism to devolution: Twenty-five years of intergovernmental 
reform. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Cooper, K. J. (1993, April 1). Four House select committees expire as symbols of reform, The 
Washington Post, p. A14.  
Crenson, M. A. (1971). The unpolitics of air pollution. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Cross, C. (2003). Political education: National policy comes of age. New York, NY: Teachers 
College Press. 
Deering, C. J., & Smith, S. S. (1997). Committees in Congress (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: CQ 
Press. 
DeGregorio, C. (1992). Leadership approaches in congressional committee hearings. The 
Western Political Quarterly, 45(4), 971-983.  
Derthick, M., & Quirk, P. (1985). The politics of deregulation. Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution. 
Deschenes, S., McLaughlin, M., & Newman, A. (2008). Organizations advocating for youth: The 
local advantage. New Directions for Youth Development, 2008(117), 11-25.  
Dexter, L. (1970). Elite and specialized interviewing. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press. 
Diermeier, D., & Feddersen, T. J. (2000). Information and congressional hearings. American 
Journal of Political Science, 44(1), 51-65.  
Dorsen, N., & Rezneck, D. A. (1967). In re Gault and the future of juvenile law. Family Law 
Quarterly, 1(4), 1-46.  
Downs, A. (1972). Up and down with ecology: The issue attention cycle. Public Interest, 
28(Summer), 38-50.  
Edelman, M. (1994). Social psychology of politics. In L. C. Dodd & C. Jillson (Eds.), The 
dynamics of American politics: Approaches & interpretations (pp. 234-251). Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press. 
Eisner, M. A. (1993). Regulatory politics in transition. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Erikson, E. (1968). Youth: Identity and crisis. New York, NY: W.W. Norton. 
Executive Office of the President. (2003). The White House Task Force for Disadvantaged 
Youth: Preliminary report on findings for the federal response to disadvantaged youth. 
Washington, DC: Author. 
Executive Office of the President. (October 2003). White House Task Force for Disadvantaged 
Youth Final Report.  Retrieved from 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/fysb/content/docs/white_house_task_force.pdf. 







Fenno, R. F. (1973). Congressmen in committees. Boston, MA: Little Brown. 
Fernandes, A. L. (2007). Vulnerable youth: Background and policies. (RL33975). Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from 
http://www.danielkids.org/Sites/web/docs/youthreport_RL33975.pdf. 
Flanagan, C., & Syvertsen, A. K. (2005). Youth as a social construct and social actor. In L. 
Sherrod, C. A. Flanagan, R. Kassimir & A. B. Syvertsen (Eds.), Youth activism: An 
international encyclopedia (pp. 11-19). Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing. 
Furstenberg, F. F. (2006). Growing up healthy: Are adolescents the right target group? Journal of 
Adolescent Health, 39(3), 303–304.  
Gaventa, J. (1980). Power and powerlessness in an Appalachian Valley. Champaign, IL: 
University of Illinois Press. 
Gerring, J. (2001). Social science methodology: A critical framework. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gray, V., & Lowery, D. (1996). The population ecology of interest representation. Ann Arbor, 
MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Hall, G. S. (1904). Adolescence. New York, NY: Appleton. 
Hardin, J. (1998). Advocacy versus certainty: The dynamics of committee jurisdiction 
concentration. Journal of Politics, 60(2), 374-397.  
Harlow, C. W. (2003). Education and correctional populations, Bureau of Justice Statistics 
special report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. 
Heclo, H. (1978). Issue networks and the executive establishment. In A. King (Ed.), The New 
American Political System (pp. 87-125). Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute 
Press. 
Hilgartner, S., & Bosk, C. L. (1988). The rise and fall of social problems: A public arenas model. 
The American Journal of Sociology, 94(1), 53-78.  
Hogan, D. P., & Astone, N. M. (1986). The transition to adulthood. Annual Review of Sociology, 
12, 109-130.  
Hojnacki, M. (1997). Interest groups' decisions to join alliances or work alone. American Journal 
of Political Science, 41(1), 61-87.  
Holian, D. B. (2004). He's stealing my issues! Clinton's crime rhetoric and the dynamics of issue 
ownership. Political Behavior, 26(2), 95-124. 
Howell, W., Peterson, P. E., & West, M. (2011). Meeting of the minds. Education Next, 11(1), 
21-31.  
Huitt, R. K. (1954). The congressional committee: A case study. The American Political Science 
Review, 48(2), 340-365.  
Hula, K. W. (1999). Lobbying together: Interest group coalitions in legislative politics. 
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (U.S. Supreme Court 1967). 
Ingram, H., Schneider, A., & deLeon, P. (2007). Social construction and policy design. In P. A. 
Sabatier (Ed.), Theories of the policy process (2nd ed., pp. 93-128). Boulder, CO: 
Westview. 
Institute of Medicine, & National Research Council. (2011). The science of adolescent risk-
taking: Workshop report. Committee on the Sciences of Adolescence. Washington, DC: 







Jillson, C. (1994). Patterns and periodicity in American national politics. In L. C. Dodd & C. 
Jillson (Eds.), The dynamics of American politics: Approaches and interpretations (pp. 
24-58). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Jones, B. D. (2003). Bounded rationality and political science: Lessons from public 
administration and public policy. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 
13(4), 395-412.  
Judd, D. R., & Swanstrom, T. (2008). City politics: The political economy of urban America (6th 
ed.). New York, NY: Pearson Education. 
Kaestle, C. F., & Lodewick, A. E. (Eds.). (2007). To educate a nation: Federal and national 
strategies of school reform. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. 
Kantor, H., & Lowe, R. (1995). Class, race, and the emergence of federal education policy: From 
the New Deal to the Great Society. Educational Researcher, 24(3), 4-11.  
Katz, L. F., & Autor, D. H. (1999). Changes in the wage structure and earnings inequality. In O. 
C. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds.), Handbook for labor economics (Vol. 3A, pp. 1463-
1555). Amsterdam, NL: North-Holland. 
King, D. C. (1994). The nature of congressional committee jurisdictions. The American Political 
Science Review, 88(1), 48-62.  
Kingdon, J. (2003). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies (second ed.). New York, NY: 
Longman. 
Koelble, T. A. (1995). Review: The new institutionalism in political science and sociology. 
Comparative Politics, 27(2), 231-243.  
Leach, W. D., & Sabatier, P. A. (2005). To trust an adversary: Integrating rational and 
psychological models of collaborative policymaking. American Political Science Review, 
99(4), 491-503.  
Leech, B. L. (2002). Symposium: Interview methods in political science. PS: Political Science 
and Politics, 35(4), 663-664.  
Leyden, K. M. (1995). Interest group resources and testimony at congressional hearings. 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 20(3), 431-439.  
Lindblom, C. E., & Woodhouse, E. J. (1993). The policy-making process (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Lowery, D., & Gray, V. (1998). Representational concentration and interest community size: A 
population ecology interpretation. Political Research Quarterly, 51(4), 919-944.  
Lowi, T. (1967). Public philosophy - Interest group liberalism. American Political Science 
Review, 61(1), 5-24.  
Lowi, T. (1979). The end of liberalism: The second republic of the United States (2nd ed.). New 
York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company. 
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1989). Rediscovering institutions. New York, NY: Free Press. 
Massey, D., & Denton, N. (1993). American apartheid: Segregation and the making of the 
underclass. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
McGuinn, P. J. (2006). No Child Left Behind and the transformation of federal education policy, 
1965-2005. Lawrence, KS: The University of Kansas Press. 
McLaughlin, M., Scott, W. R., Deschenes, S., Hopkins, K., & Newman, A. (2009). Between 
movement and establishment: Organizations advocating for youth. Stanford, CA: 







Meijerink, S. (2005). Understanding policy stability and change: The interplay of advocacy 
coalitions and epistemic communities, windows of opportunity, and Dutch coastal 
flooding policy 1945-2003. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(6), 1060-1077.  
Children, youth, and families: Begininning the assessment, U.S. House of Representatives, 98th 
Congress, 1st Sess. (1983). 
Mintrom, M., & Vergari, S. (1996). Advocacy coalitions, policy entrepreneurs, and policy 
changes. Policy Studies Journal, 24(3), 420-434.  
The National Commission on Excellence in Education. (1983). A nation at risk. Washington, 
DC: Author. 
Newman, R. P., Smith, S. M., & Murphy, R. (2000). A matter of money: The cost and financing 
of youth development. In G. Walker (Ed.), Youth development: Issues, challenges, and 
directions (pp. 82-124). Philadelphia, PA: Public/Private Ventures. 
Older Americans Act Amendments of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-365 (2006). 
Oleszek, W. J. (1989). Congressional procedures and the policy process. Washington, DC: CQ 
Press. 
Olson, M. (1971). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups (Revised 
ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Osgood, W. D., Foster, M. E., & Courtney, M. E. (2010). Vulnerable populations and the 
transition to adulthood. The Future of Children, 20(1), 209-229.  
Osgood, W. D., Foster, M. E., Flanagan, C., & Ruth, G. R. (Eds.). (2007). On your own without 
a net: The transition to adulthood for vulnerable populations. Chicago, IL: University Of 
Chicago Press. 
Passow, A. H. (1977). Urban education: The new challenge. Educational Researcher, 6(5), 5-10.  
Peterson, P. E. (1995). The price of federalism. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution 
Press. 
Petrocik, J. R. (1996). Issue ownership in presidential elections, with a 1980 case study. 
American Journal of Political Science, 40(3), 825-850.  
Petrocik, J. R., Benoit, W. L., & Hansen, G. J. (2003). Issue ownership and presidential 
campaigning, 1952-2000. Political Science Quarterly, 118(4), 599-626.  
Pierson, P. (2000). Not just what, but when: Timing and sequence in political processes. Studies 
in American Political Development, 14(1), 72-92.  
Pittman, K., Irby, M., & Ferber, T. (2000). Unfinished business: Further reflections on a decade 
of promoting youth development. In G. Walker & N. Jaffe (Eds.), Youth development: 
Issues, challenges, and directions (pp. 17-64). Philadelphia, PA: Public/Private Ventures. 
Pittman, K., O'Brien, R., & Kimball, M. (1993). Youth development and resiliency research: 
Making connections to substance abuse prevention. New York, NY: Center for Youth 
Development and Policy Research, Academy for Educational Development. 
Policy Agendas Project. (n.d.). Topics Codebook. Retrieved October 5, 2009, from 
http://www.policyagendas.org/codebooks/topicindex.html 
Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (1997). Congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Praeger, R. (1977). Youth employment: A summary history of major federal programs, 1933-
1976. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
Reeves, A. E. (1993). Congressional committee chairmen: Three who made an evolution. 







Rich, A. (2004). Think tanks, public policy, and the politics of expertise. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ross, M. H. (1997). Culture and identity in comparative politics. In M. Lichback & A. 
Zuckerman (Eds.), Comparative politics: Rationality, culture, and structure. New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Rouse, C. (2005). The labor market consequences of an inadequate education. Paper presented 
at the Symposium on the Social Costs of an Inadequate Education, Teachers College, 
Columbia University New York, NY. 
Sabatier, P. A. (1986). Top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation research: A 
critical analysis and suggested synthesis. Journal of Public Policy, 6(1), 21-48.  
Sabatier, P. A. (1991). Toward better theories of the policy process. PS: Political Science and 
Politics, 24(2), 147-156.  
Sabatier, P. A. (Ed.). (2007). Theories of the policy process (2nd ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press. 
Sabatier, P. A., & Jenkins-Smith, H. C. (1999). Advocacy coalition framework: An assessment. 
In P. A. Sabatier (Ed.), Theories of the policy process (pp. 117-166). Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press. 
Sabatier, P. A., & Jenkins-Smith, H. C. (Eds.). (1993). Policy change and learning: An advocacy 
coalition approach. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Sabatier, P. A., & Weible, C. M. (2007). The advocacy coalition framework: Innovations and 
clarifications. In P. A. Sabatier (Ed.), Theories of the policy process (pp. 189-220). 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Salisbury, R. H. (1969). An exchange theory of interest groups. Midwest Journal of Political 
Science, 13(1), 1-32.  
Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). The semi-sovereign people. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston. 
Schlossman, S., & Wallach, S. (1978). The crime of precocious sexuality: Female juvenile 
delinquency in the Progressive Era. Harvard Educational Review, 48(1), 65-94.  
Schneider, A., & Ingram, H. (1993). Social construction of target populations: Implications for 
politics and policy. American Political Science Review, 87(2), 334-343.  
Schneider, A., & Sidney, M. (2009). What is next for policy design and social construction 
theory? The Policy Studies Journal, 37(1), 103-119.  
Schneider, J., Campbell, C., Davis, C. M., & Palmer, B. (2003). Reorganization of the Senate: 
Modern reform efforts. (RL32112). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 
Schneider, J., Davis, C. M., & Palmer, B. (2003). Reorganization of the House of 
Representatives: Modern reform efforts. (RL31835). Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service. 
Schwartz, R. G. (2000). Juvenile justice and positive youth development. In G. Walker & N. 
Jaffe (Eds.), Youth development: Issues, challenges, and directions (pp. 233-280). 
Philadelphia, PA: Public/Private Ventures. 
Scott, R. W., Deschenes, S., Hopkins, K., Newman, A., & McLaughlin, M. (2006). Advocacy 
organizations and the field of youth services: Ongoing efforts to restructure a field. 
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 35(4), 691-714.  
Settersten Jr., R. A., Furstenberg Jr., F. F., & Rumbaut, R. G. (Eds.). (2005). On the frontier of 








Simon, H. (1983). Reason in human affairs. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Simon, H. (1985). Human nature in politics: The dialogue of psychology with political science. 
American Political Science Review, 79(2), 293-304.  
Skocpol, T. (1992). Protecting soldiers and mothers: The political origins of social policy in the 
United States. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Skocpol, T. (1996). The politics of American social policy, past and future. In V. R. Fuchs (Ed.), 
Individual and social responsibility: Child care, education, medical care, and long-term 
care in America (pp. 309-340). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Smith, R. A. (1984). Advocacy, interpretation, and influence in the U.S. Congress. The American 
Political Science Review, 78(1), 44-63.  
Spano, S. (2004). Stages of adolescent development. ACT for Youth Upstate Center of 
Excellence Research Facts and Findings. Retrieved from 
http://www.actforyouth.net/resources/rf/rf_stages_0504.pdf 
Steinberg, L., & Lerner, R. M. (2004). The scientific study of adolescence. The Journal of Early 
Adolescence, 24(1), 45-54.  
Stone, D. (2002). Policy paradox: The art of political decision making (revised ed.). New York, 
NY: W.W Norton & Company. 
Talbert, J. C., Jones, B. D., & Baumgartner, F. R. (1995). Nonlegislative hearings and policy 
change in Congress. American Journal of Political Science, 39(2), 383-205.  
Task Force on Education of Young Adolescents. (1989). Turning points: Preparing American 
youth for the 21st century. New York, NY: Carnegie Council on Adolescent 
Development. 
The Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment. (1980). The youth employment 
problem: Causes and dimensions A review of youth employment problems, programs, and 
policies (Vol. 1). Washington, DC: Author. 
The White House Task Force for Disadvantaged Youth. (2003). Preliminary report on findings 
for the federal response to disadvantaged youth. Washington, DC: Author. 
The William T. Grant Foundation Commission on Work Family and Citizenship. (1988). The 
Forgotten Half: Pathways to Success for America's Youth and Young Families. 
Washington, DC: Author. 
Thorstensen, B. I. (2005). If you build it, they will come. Investing in public education 
[Electronic Version]. Retrieved March 5, 2007, from 
http://abec.unm.edu/resources/gallery/present/invest_in_ed.pdf 
Time. (1977). Arson for hate and profit. [Article]. Time, 110(18), 22.  
Tocqueville, A., & Heffner, R.C.. (2001). Democracy in America. New York, NY: Signet 
Classics. 
True, J. L., Jones, B. D., & Baumgartner, F. R. (2007). Punctuated equilibrium theory: 
Explaining stability and change in public policymaking. In P. A. Sabatier (Ed.), Theories 
of the policy process (pp. 155-187). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Truman, D. B. (1951). The governmental process: Political interests and public opinion. New 
York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf. 
U.S. General Accounting Office. (March 1996). At-risk and delinquent youth: Multiple federal 
programs raise efficiency questions (GAO/HEHS-96-34). Washington, DC: U.S. 








U.S. Government Printing Office. (2005). Congressional hearings.  Retrieved April 1, 2009, 
from http://www.gpoaccess.gov/chearings/about.html 
United States Government Accountability Office. (February 2008). Disconnected youth: Federal 
action could address some of the challenges faced by local programs that reconnect youth 
to education and employment. Washington, DC: Report to the Chairman, Committee on 
Education and Labor, House of Representatives. 
Vogel, D. (1987). Political science and the study of corporate power: A dissent from the new 
conventional wisdom. British Journal of Political Science, 17(4), 385-408.  
Wald, M., & Martinez, T. (2003). Connected by 25: Improving the life chances of the country's 
most vulnerable 14 – 24 year olds. William and Flora Hewitt Foundation Working Paper. 
Menlo Park, CA: William and Flora Hewitt Foundation. 
Walker, G. (2000). The policy climate for early adolescent initiatives. In G. Walker (Ed.), Youth 
development: Issues, challenges, and directions (pp. 66-80). Philadelphia, PA: 
Public/Private Ventures. 
Wall Street Journal. (1993, February 2). REVIEW & OUTLOOK (Editorial): Self-Selection, 
Wall Street Journal, p. A14.  
Weaver, R. K. (1989). The changing world of think tanks. PS: Political Science & Politics, 
22(3), 563-578.  
Weir, M., Orloff, A. S., & Skocpol, T. (1988). Understanding American social politics. In M. 
Weir, A. S. Orloff & T. Skocpol (Eds.), The politics of social policy in the United States 
(pp. 3-27). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Weisbrod, B. A., Ballou, J. P., & Asch, E. D. (2008). Mission and money: Understanding the 
university. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Wilson, J. Q. (1973). Political organizations. New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc. 
Wilson, W. J. (1990). The truly disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass, and public policy. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press  
Wong, K. K., Shen, F. X., Anagnostopoulos, D., & Rutledge, S. (2007). The education mayor. 
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Youth Transition Funders Group. (n.d.). About YTFG. Retrieved April 22, 2012, from 
http://www.ytfg.org/about-ytfg 
Zahariadis, N. (2007). The multiple streams framework: Structure, limitations, prospects. In P. 
A. Sabatier (Ed.), Theories of the policy process (2nd ed., pp. 65-92). Boulder, CO: 
Westview. 
Zigler, E., & Muenchow, S. (1984). How to influence social policy affecting children and 








Appendix A  
Table A1: Legislative histories searched, listed in chronological order (n = 107) 
Juvenile Justice (n = 19) 
1. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 
2. Crime Control Act of 1976 
3. Juvenile Justice Amendments of 1977 
4. Juvenile Justice Amendments of 1980 
5. Missing Children Act, 1982 
6. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 
7. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 
8. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 
9. Crime Control Act of 1990 
10. Drug Abuse Prevention and Education Authorization, 1991 
11. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Appropriations Authorization, FY93-FY96 
12. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 
13. Drug-Free Communities Act of 1997 
14. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, 2002 
15. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act 
of 2003 or PROTECT Act 
16. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 
17. Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006 
18. Protecting Our Children Comes First Act of 2007 
19. Providing Resources, Officers, and Technology To Eradicate Cyber Threats to Our 
Children Act of 2008 or PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008 
 
Education (n = 18) 
1. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 
2. Higher Education Act of 1965, reauthorized in 1976 
3. Higher Education Act of 1965, reauthorized in 1980 
4. Carl D. Perkins Vocational Education Act, 1984  
5. Higher Education Act of 1965, reauthorized in 1986 
6. Augustus F. Hawkins-Robert T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary School 
Improvement Amendments of 1988  
7. School Dropout Prevention and Basic Skills Improvement Act of 1990 
8. School Dropout Demonstration Programs, 1990 – no hearings 
9. National Literacy Act of 1991 
10. Higher Education Act of 1965, reauthorized in 1992 
11. Goals 2000: Educate America Act, 1994 
12. Improving America's Schools Act of 1994 
13. Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Applied Technology Education Amendments of 1998 
14. Higher Education Act of 1965, reauthorized in 1998 







16. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 200424 
17. Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Improvement Act of 2006 
18. Higher Education Opportunity Act, 2008 
 
Workforce Development (n = 13) 
1. Youth Conservation Corps Amendments of 1974 
2. Headstart, Economic Opportunity, and Community Partnership Act of 1974 
3. Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 
4. Comprehensive Employment and Training Act Amendments of 1978 
5. Youth Employment Demonstration Amendments of 1981 
6. Job Training Partnership Act, 1983 
7. Job Training Partnership Act Amendments of l986 
8. Training Reform Amendments of 1992 
9. National and Community Service Trust Act of 1993 
10. School-to-Work Opportunities Act of 1994 
11. Workforce Investment Act of 1998 
12. YouthBuild Transfer Act, 2006 
13. Serve America Act, 201125 
 
Public Health (n = 25) 
1. Public Health Service Act, amendments, 1975 
2. Public Health Service Act, amendments; Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Act, extension 
1976 
3. Health Services Programs, extension, 1977 
4. Public Health Service Act, amendment, 1978 
5. Mental Health Systems Act of 1980 
6. Public Health Service Act Programs Extension, 1984 
7. Miscellaneous Health Provisions, 1986 
8. Indian Land Conveyances, Forest Management, Child Abuse Prevention, and Health 
Care Programs, 1990 
9. ADAMHA Reorganization Act, 1992 
10. Indian Health Amendments of 1992 
11. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993 
12. Children's Health Act of 2000 
13. Welfare Reform Extension Act of 2003 
14. Garrett Lee Smith Memorial Act, 2004 
15. Welfare Reform Extension Act, Part VIII 2004 
16. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Related Programs Continuation 
Act of 2004 
17. Welfare Reform Extension Act of 2004 
                                                     
24
 It was also reauthorized in 1997, but not included because none of the associated hearings had an explicit youth 
focus. 
25







18. Qualified Individual Program (QI), Transitional Medical Assistance (TMA), and 
Abstinence Programs Extension and Hurricane Katrina Unemployment Relief Act of 
2005 
19. Welfare Reform Extension Act of 2005 
20. Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005 
21. Sober Truth on Preventing Underage Drinking Act or STOP Act, 2006 
22. Abstinence Education and QI Programs Extension Act of 2007 
23. Medicaid Transitional Assistance and Abstinence Education Programs Temporary 
Extension 2007 
24. Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 
25. Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009 or PACT Act 
 
Social Service (n = 32) 
1. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 
2. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 
3. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978 
4. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 
5. Federal Supplemental Compensation Act of 1982, amendment 
6. Amendment of Part A of Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 1984 
7. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 
8. Child Abuse Prevention, Adoption, and Family Services Act of 1986 
9. Income Security and Related Programs, 1987 
10. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 1987 
11. Child Abuse Prevention, Adoption, and Family Services Act of 1988 
12. Domestic Volunteer Service Act Amendments of 1989 
13. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Amendments Act of 1990 
14. Child Abuse, Domestic Violence, Adoption and Family Services Act of 1992 
15. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 
16. Healthy Meals for Healthy Americans Act of 1994 
17. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
18. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of 1996 
19. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 
20. Missing, Exploited, and Runaway Children Protection Act, 1999 
21. Foster Care Independence Act of 1999 
22. Strengthening Abuse and Neglect Courts Act of 2000 
23. D.C. Receivership Accountability Act of 2000 
24. Promoting Safe and Stable Families Amendments of 2001 
25. Runaway, Homeless, and Missing Children Protection Act, 2003 
26. Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003 
27. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
28. Child and Family Services Improvement Act of 2006 
29. Older Americans Act Amendments of 200626 
30. Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 
31. Reconnecting Homeless Youth Act of 2008 
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32. Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009; Homeless Emergency Assistance and 








Table A2: Search terms used for data collection, in alphabetical order 
 
1. Administration for Children, Youth, and Families 
2. Adult education 
3. Antipoverty programs 
4. Black students 
5. Career education 
6. Child welfare  
7. Children  
8. Compulsory education 
9. Courts 
10. Crime and criminals 
11. Drugs and youth 
12. Education, Health, and Public Welfare 
13. Education 
14. Elementary and secondary education 
15. Federal aid to education 
16. Federal aid to higher education 
17. Federal aid to local governments, education 
18. Federal aid to states, education 
19. Federal aid to states, public welfare programs 
20. Federal aid to vocational education 
21. Foster home care 
22. Higher education 
23. High school 
24. Homelessness 
25. Juvenile Courts 
26. Juvenile delinquency 
27. Juvenile detention and correctional institutions 
28. Law and Justice 
29. Manpower training programs 
30. National Advisory Committee on the Education of Handicapped Children and Youth 
31. National Youth Administration 
32. Neighborhood youth corps 
33. New careers program 
34. Office of Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Development 
35. Poverty 
36. Presidential Commission on Child and Youth Deaths 
37. President’s Council on Youth Opportunity 
38. Prisons 
39. Public services career program 
40. Public service employment 
41. Public welfare programs 
42. Runaway and missing persons 
43. Students 







45. School lunch and breakfast programs 
46. Upward Bound Programs 
47. Vocational education 
48. Vocational rehabilitation 
49. White House Conference on Children, Youth, and Families 
50. White Conference on Youth 
51. Work incentive programs 
52. Youth 
53. Youth conservation corps 
54. Youth employment 









Table B1: Political party controlling Legislative and Executive branches of government, 93rd to 
110th Congress, 1973 to 2008 
Year Congress Presidential Party Senate Party House of Representatives Party 
1973 93 Republican Democrat Democrat 
1974 93 Republican Democrat Democrat 
1975 94 Republican Democrat Democrat 
1976 94 Republican Democrat Democrat 
1977 95 Democrat Democrat Democrat 
1978 95 Democrat Democrat Democrat 
1979 96 Democrat Democrat Democrat 
1980 96 Democrat Democrat Democrat 
1981 97 Republican Republican Democrat 
1982 97 Republican Republican Democrat 
1983 98 Republican Republican Democrat 
1984 98 Republican Republican Democrat 
1985 99 Republican Republican Democrat 
1986 99 Republican Republican Democrat 
1987 100 Republican Republican Democrat 
1988 100 Republican Republican Democrat 
1989 101 Republican Republican Democrat 
1990 101 Republican Republican Democrat 
1991 102 Republican Republican Democrat 
1992 102 Republican Republican Democrat 
1993 103 Democrat Republican Democrat 
1994 103 Democrat Republican Democrat 
1995 104 Democrat Republican Republican 
1996 104 Democrat Republican Republican 
1997 105 Democrat Republican Republican 
1998 105 Democrat Republican Republican 
1999 106 Democrat Republican Republican 
2000 106 Democrat Democrat
27
 Republican 
2001 107 Republican Republican Republican 
2002 107 Republican Republican Republican 
2003 108 Republican Republican Republican 
2004 108 Republican Republican Republican 
2005 109 Republican Republican Republican 
2006 109 Republican Republican Republican 
2007 110 Republican Republican Democrat 
2008 110 Republican Republican Democrat 
                                                     
27
 Characterized as Democratically controlled because more of the year was under Democratic control rather than 
Republican control after Sen. Jim Jeffords from Vermont switched political parties on May 24, 2001. Previously, the 
Senate was split evenly between the two parties and Republican Vice President Dick Cheney served as the deciding 






Table B2: Committees holding youth hearings from 1973 to 2008, (n = 986) 
 





House of Representatives 
Committee on Agriculture (1820-
present) 
4 0.4% 0.7%   
Committee on Appropriations (1865-
present) 
10 1.0% 1.6%   
Committee on Oversight & 
Government Reform (2007-present) 
42 4.3% 6.9% Includes hearings from Committee on Government Reform (1999-2007), 
Committee on District of Columbia (1808-1999), & Committee on Post 
Office & Civil Service (1946-1999). 
Committee on Education & Labor 
(1947-1995 & 2007-2010) 
344 34.9% 56.5% Includes hearings from the Committee on Economic & Educational 
Opportunities (1995-1997) & the Committee on Education & the 
Workforce (1997-2007). In 2011 name changed to Committee on Education 
and the Workforce.  
Committee on Energy & Commerce 
(1981-present) 
35 3.5% 5.7% Includes hearings from Committee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce 
(1891-1981) and Committee on Commerce (1819-1981). 
Committee on Children, Youth, and 
Families, Select (1983-1993) 
40 4.1% 6.6% Committee Disbanded. 
Committee on Financial Services 
(2001-present) 
4 0.4% 0.7% New Name. Includes hearings from Committee on Banking, Finance, and 
Urban Affairs (1975-1995). 
Committee on Judiciary (1813-present) 38 3.9% 6.2%   
Committee on Crime, Select (1971-
1973) 
2 0.2% 0.3% Committee Disbanded. 
Committee on Narcotics Abuse and 
Control, Select (1977-1993) 
4 0.4% 0.7% Committee Disbanded. 
Committee on Population, Select 
(1977-1981) 
1 0.1% 0.2% Committee Disbanded. 
Committee on Science, Space, and 
Technology (1977-1995; 2007-present) 
4 0.4% 0.7% New Name. 












Committee on the Budget (1974-
present) 
7 0.7% 1.1%  
Committee on Ways and Means (1802-
present) 
62 6.3% 10.2%  
Committee on Natural Resources 
(1993-1995; 2007-present) 
7 0.7% 1.1% New Name. Includes hearings from Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs (1951-1993) and Committee on Resources (1995-2007). 
Joint 
Joint Economic Committee (1946-
present) 
5 0.5% 100.0%   
Senate 
Committee on Appropriations (1867-
present) 
21 2.1% 5.6%   
Committee on Banking, Housing, & 
Urban Affairs (1970-present) 
4 0.4% 1.1%   
Committee on Finance (1816-present) 21 2.1% 5.6%   
Committee on Judiciary (1816-present) 71 7.2% 19.1%   
Committee on the Budget (1974-
present) 
4 0.4% 1.1%   
Committee on Energy & Natural 
Resources (1977-present) 
4 0.4% 1.1% New Name. Includes hearings from Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs (1948-1977). 
Committee on Commerce, Science, 
Transportation (1977-present) 
5 0.5% 1.3% New Name. Includes hearings from Committee on Commerce (1961-1977). 
Committee on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs (2005-present) 
17 1.7% 4.6% New Name. Includes hearings from the Committee on Government 
Operations (1952-1977) & Committee on Governmental Affairs (1977-
2005). 
Committee on Health, Education, 
Labor, & Pensions (1999-present) 
196 19.9% 52.7% Includes hearings from the Committee on Labor & Public Welfare (1947-
1977), Committee on Human Resources (1977-1979), and Committee on 
Labor & Human Resources (1979-1999). 
Committee on Indian Affairs (1993-
present) 












Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, 
& Forestry (1997-present) 
3 0.3% 0.8% New Name. Includes hearings from the Committee on Agriculture & 
Forestry (1884-1977) & the Select Committee on Nutrition & Human 
Needs (1968-1977) 
Committee on Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship (1981-present) 
1 0.1% 0.3% From 1981-2001 it was called the Committee on Small Business. 








Table B3: Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, & Pension Youth Hearings by Congress and Type, 1973-2008 (n = 196) 
 
Years Cong. CJ ED PH SS WD Total Chairman Political Party 
of Chairman 
1973-1974 93rd 3 6 3 6 4 22 Harrison Williams Jr. Democrat 
1975-1976 94th 0 1 5 9 2 17 Harrison Williams Jr. Democrat 
1977-1978 95th 3 0 2 1 2 8 Harrison Williams Jr. Democrat 
1979-1980 96th 2 2 1 1 4 10 Harrison Williams Jr. Democrat 
1981-1982 97th 4 0 2 1 2 9 Orrin Hatch Republican 
1983-1984 98th 1 0 4 0 3 8 Orrin Hatch Republican 
1985-1986 99th 2 8 3 2 1 16 Orrin Hatch Republican 
1987-1988 100th 1 3 1 1 2 8 Edward Kennedy Democrat 
1989-1990 101st 7 2 2 5 2 18 Edward Kennedy Democrat 
1991-1992 102nd 2 8 0 3 1 14 Edward Kennedy Democrat 
1993-1994 103rd 2 6 1 0 4 13 Edward Kennedy Democrat 
1995-1996 104th 2 2 0 2 4 10 Nancy Kassebaum Republican 
1997-1998 105th 0 12 0 0 4 16 James Jeffords Republican 
1999-2000 106th 2 6 1 0 0 9 James Jeffords Republican 
2001-2002 107th 0 2 1 0 1 4 Edward Kennedy & James Jeffords Democrat 
2003-2004 108th 1 4 3 0 1 9 Judd Gregg Republican 
2005-2006 109th 0 3 0 0 0 3 Michael Enzi Republican 
2007-2008 110th 0 1 0 0 1 2 Edward Kennedy Democrat 







Table B4: House of Representatives Committee on Education & Labor Youth Hearings by Congress and Type, 1973-2008 (n = 344) 
 
Years Cong. CJ ED PH SS WD Total Chairman 
Political Party 
of Chairman 
1973-1974 93rd 2 7 0 4 5 18 Carl Perkins Democrat 
1975-1976 94th 2 3 3 1 5 14 Carl Perkins Democrat 
1977-1978 95th 3 0 0 0 4 7 Carl Perkins Democrat 
1979-1980 96th 2 12 0 0 6 20 Carl Perkins Democrat 
1981-1982 97th 1 0 0 2 20 23 Carl Perkins Democrat 
1983-1984 98th 2 7 0 1 5 15 Carl Perkins Democrat 
1985-1986 99th 2 26 1 1 5 35 Augustus Hawkins Democrat 
1987-1988 100th 6 5 1 3 3 18 Augustus Hawkins Democrat 
1989-1990 101st 0 4 0 0 3 7 Augustus Hawkins Democrat 
1991-1992 102nd 7 33 1 2 2 45 William Ford  Democrat 
1993-1994 103rd 0 8 3 2 5 18 William Ford  Democrat 
1995-1996 104th 2 6 0 2 4 14 William Goodling Republican 
1997-1998 105th 4 22 0 0 4 30 William Goodling Republican 
1999-2000 106th 6 23 1 1 0 31 William Goodling Republican 
2001-2002 107th 3 5 0 0 2 10 John Boehner  Republican 
2003-2004 108th 1 14 1 1 4 21 John Boehner  Republican 
2005-2006 109th 2 4 0 1 1 8 John Boehner & Howard McKeon Republican 
2007-2008 110th 5 1 1 1 2 10 George Miller Democrat 























Court K12 PH SS WD CJ ED 
Higher 
ED 
Bus. Other Total 
73-74 93 127 94 86 33 10 8 28 70 33 81 52 43 187 30 105 987 
75-76 94 80 65 69 23 0 7 9 55 26 22 10 26 62 19 60 533 
77-78 95 39 49 86 25 12 3 4 46 36 30 34 5 45 4 70 488 
79-80 96 76 89 79 71 0 2 12 31 44 62 27 52 279 31 132 987 
81-82 97 71 58 44 13 3 6 12 27 18 48 26 22 62 25 54 489 
83-84 98 52 56 49 29 9 9 12 50 55 33 32 54 172 25 52 689 
85-86 99 48 81 76 74 50 1 17 32 38 37 25 38 426 40 111 1,094 
87-88 100 77 75 51 45 22 11 6 55 94 12 43 25 82 27 82 707 
89-90 101 58 56 77 18 20 11 9 62 38 37 41 24 83 20 51 605 
91-92 102 61 85 68 43 11 9 12 40 54 59 37 34 484 47 75 1,119 
93-94 103 53 27 55 29 2 8 21 61 23 33 30 24 63 32 89 550 
95-96 104 66 54 59 62 2 17 9 38 48 46 19 24 65 19 74 602 
97-98 105 44 41 51 18 0 7 8 25 8 66 14 28 180 13 24 527 
99-00 106 57 51 51 26 16 7 38 27 16 6 19 55 54 16 87 526 
01-02 107 6 9 25 9 1 6 2 11 5 6 8 6 31 11 21 157 
03-04 108 16 20 32 12 0 2 2 25 12 13 19 8 76 24 20 281 
05-06 109 36 19 56 11 4 4 2 13 6 5 21 4 43 20 31 275 
07-08 110 33 40 28 22 4 2 2 27 29 14 14 8 36 10 39 308 
Total  1,000 969 1,042 563 166 120 205 695 583 610 471 480 2,430 413 1,177 10,924 
 
Note. Cong = Congressional session or member of Congress, Loc. Gov. = local government; State Gov. = state government; Fed. Gov. = federal government, 
Ind. Gov. = Native American tribe; Court = member of judicial system; K12 = public or private K12 school; PH = public health; SS = social service, WD = 






























Graph B1: Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions 





































Graph B2: House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor 





































Graph B3: Witnesses by Congress and Type, 1973-2008, (n = 10,924) 
Governmental 
Non-Governmental 
